ÿû wrapster1.0The.Art.Of.War.By.Sun.Tzu.rtfÈiþ³{\rtf1\ansi\ansicpg1252\deff0\deflang1033{\fonttbl{\f0\fswiss\fcharset0 Arial;}} {\colortbl ;\red0\green0\blue0;} \viewkind4\uc1\pard\cf1\b\f0\fs22 The Art Of War\par \par -----------------------------------------------------------------\par \par I. LAYING PLANS\par \par [Ts`ao Kung, in defining the meaning of the Chinese for the \par title of this chapter, says it refers to the deliberations in the \par temple selected by the general for his temporary use, or as we \par should say, in his tent. See. ss. 26.]\par \par 1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to \par the State. \par 2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to \par safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on \par no account be neglected. \par 3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant \par factors, to be taken into account in one's deliberations, when \par seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field. \par 4. These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; \par (4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline. \par \par [It appears from what follows that Sun Tzu means by "Moral \par Law" a principle of harmony, not unlike the Tao of Lao Tzu in its \par moral aspect. One might be tempted to render it by "morale," \par were it not considered as an attribute of the ruler in ss. 13.] \par \par 5, 6. The MORAL LAW causes the people to be in complete \par accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless \par of their lives, undismayed by any danger. \par \par [Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying: "Without constant \par practice, the officers will be nervous and undecided when \par mustering for battle; without constant practice, the general will \par be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand."]\par \par 7. HEAVEN signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and \par seasons. \par \par [The commentators, I think, make an unnecessary mystery of \par two words here. Meng Shih refers to "the hard and the soft, \par waxing and waning" of Heaven. Wang Hsi, however, may be right in \par saying that what is meant is "the general economy of Heaven," \par including the five elements, the four seasons, wind and clouds, \par and other phenomena.] \par \par 8. EARTH comprises distances, great and small; danger and \par security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and \par death. \par 9. The COMMANDER stands for the virtues of wisdom, \par sincerely, benevolence, courage and strictness. \par \par [The five cardinal virtues of the Chinese are (1) humanity \par or benevolence; (2) uprightness of mind; (3) self-respect, self-\par control, or "proper feeling;" (4) wisdom; (5) sincerity or good \par faith. Here "wisdom" and "sincerity" are put before "humanity or \par benevolence," and the two military virtues of "courage" and \par "strictness" substituted for "uprightness of mind" and "self-\par respect, self-control, or 'proper feeling.'"] \par \par 10. By METHOD AND DISCIPLINE are to be understood the \par marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the \par graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads \par by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military \par expenditure. \par 11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: \par he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will \par fail. \par 12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to \par determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of \par a comparison, in this wise: --\par 13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the \par Moral law? \par \par [I.e., "is in harmony with his subjects." Cf. ss. 5.] \par \par (2) Which of the two generals has most ability? \par (3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and \par Earth? \par \par [See ss. 7,8] \par \par (4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced? \par \par [Tu Mu alludes to the remarkable story of Ts`ao Ts`ao (A.D. \par 155-220), who was such a strict disciplinarian that once, in \par accordance with his own severe regulations against injury to \par standing crops, he condemned himself to death for having allowed \par him horse to shy into a field of corn! However, in lieu of \par losing his head, he was persuaded to satisfy his sense of justice \par by cutting off his hair. Ts`ao Ts`ao's own comment on the \par present passage is characteristically curt: "when you lay down a \par law, see that it is not disobeyed; if it is disobeyed the \par offender must be put to death."]\par \par (5) Which army is stronger? \par \par [Morally as well as physically. As Mei Yao-ch`en puts it, \par freely rendered, "ESPIRIT DE CORPS and 'big battalions.'"] \par \par (6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained? \par \par [Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying: "Without constant \par practice, the officers will be nervous and undecided when \par mustering for battle; without constant practice, the general will \par be wavering and irresolute when the crisis is at hand."] \par \par (7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in \par reward and punishment?\par \par [On which side is there the most absolute certainty that \par merit will be properly rewarded and misdeeds summarily punished?]\par \par 14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast \par victory or defeat.\par 15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon \par it, will conquer: --let such a one be retained in command! The \par general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will \par suffer defeat: --let such a one be dismissed!\par \par [The form of this paragraph reminds us that Sun Tzu's \par treatise was composed expressly for the benefit of his patron Ho \par Lu, king of the Wu State.]\par \par 16. While heading the profit of my counsel, avail yourself \par also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary \par rules.\par 17. According as circumstances are favorable, one should \par modify one's plans.\par \par [Sun Tzu, as a practical soldier, will have none of the \par "bookish theoric." He cautions us here not to pin our faith to \par abstract principles; "for," as Chang Yu puts it, "while the main \par laws of strategy can be stated clearly enough for the benefit of \par all and sundry, you must be guided by the actions of the enemy in \par attempting to secure a favorable position in actual warfare." On \par the eve of the battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the \par cavalry, went to the Duke of Wellington in order to learn what \par his plans and calculations were for the morrow, because, as he \par explained, he might suddenly find himself Commander-in-chief and \par would be unable to frame new plans in a critical moment. The \par Duke listened quietly and then said: "Who will attack the first \par tomorrow -- I or Bonaparte?" "Bonaparte," replied Lord Uxbridge. \par "Well," continued the Duke, "Bonaparte has not given me any idea \par of his projects; and as my plans will depend upon his, how can \par you expect me to tell you what mine are?" [1] ]\par \par 18. All warfare is based on deception.\par \par [The truth of this pithy and profound saying will be \par admitted by every soldier. Col. Henderson tells us that \par Wellington, great in so many military qualities, was especially \par distinguished by "the extraordinary skill with which he concealed \par his movements and deceived both friend and foe."]\par \par 19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when \par using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we \par must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we \par must make him believe we are near.\par 20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, \par and crush him.\par \par [All commentators, except Chang Yu, say, "When he is in \par disorder, crush him." It is more natural to suppose that Sun Tzu \par is still illustrating the uses of deception in war.]\par \par 21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If \par he is in superior strength, evade him.\par 22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to \par irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.\par \par [Wang Tzu, quoted by Tu Yu, says that the good tactician \par plays with his adversary as a cat plays with a mouse, first \par feigning weakness and immobility, and then suddenly pouncing upon \par him.]\par \par 23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest.\par \par [This is probably the meaning though Mei Yao-ch`en has the \par note: "while we are taking our ease, wait for the enemy to tire \par himself out." The YU LAN has "Lure him on and tire him out."]\par \par If his forces are united, separate them.\par \par [Less plausible is the interpretation favored by most of the \par commentators: "If sovereign and subject are in accord, put \par division between them."]\par \par 24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are \par not expected.\par 25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be \par divulged beforehand.\par 26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many \par calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought.\par \par [Chang Yu tells us that in ancient times it was customary \par for a temple to be set apart for the use of a general who was \par about to take the field, in order that he might there elaborate \par his plan of campaign.]\par \par The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations \par beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few \par calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It \par is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to \par win or lose.\par \par \par [1] "Words on Wellington," by Sir. W. Fraser.\par \par -----------------------------------------------------------------\par \par II. WAGING WAR\par \par \par [Ts`ao Kung has the note: "He who wishes to fight must \par first count the cost," which prepares us for the discovery that \par the subject of the chapter is not what we might expect from the \par title, but is primarily a consideration of ways and means.]\par \par 1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are \par in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, \par and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers,\par \par [The "swift chariots" were lightly built and, according to \par Chang Yu, used for the attack; the "heavy chariots" were heavier, \par and designed for purposes of defense. Li Ch`uan, it is true, \par says that the latter were light, but this seems hardly probable. \par It is interesting to note the analogies between early Chinese \par warfare and that of the Homeric Greeks. In each case, the war-\par chariot was the important factor, forming as it did the nucleus \par round which was grouped a certain number of foot-soldiers. With \par regard to the numbers given here, we are informed that each swift \par chariot was accompanied by 75 footmen, and each heavy chariot by \par 25 footmen, so that the whole army would be divided up into a \par thousand battalions, each consisting of two chariots and a \par hundred men.]\par \par with provisions enough to carry them a thousand LI,\par \par [2.78 modern LI go to a mile. The length may have varied \par slightly since Sun Tzu's time.]\par \par the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment \par of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on \par chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of \par silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 \par men.\par 2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long \par in coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will \par be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your \par strength.\par 3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of \par the State will not be equal to the strain.\par 4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, \par your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains \par will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, \par however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must \par ensue.\par 5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, \par cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.\par \par [This concise and difficult sentence is not well explained \par by any of the commentators. Ts`ao Kung, Li Ch`uan, Meng Shih, Tu \par Yu, Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch`en have notes to the effect that a \par general, though naturally stupid, may nevertheless conquer \par through sheer force of rapidity. Ho Shih says: "Haste may be \par stupid, but at any rate it saves expenditure of energy and \par treasure; protracted operations may be very clever, but they \par bring calamity in their train." Wang Hsi evades the difficulty \par by remarking: "Lengthy operations mean an army growing old, \par wealth being expended, an empty exchequer and distress among the \par people; true cleverness insures against the occurrence of such \par calamities." Chang Yu says: "So long as victory can be \par attained, stupid haste is preferable to clever dilatoriness." \par Now Sun Tzu says nothing whatever, except possibly by \par implication, about ill-considered haste being better than \par ingenious but lengthy operations. What he does say is something \par much more guarded, namely that, while speed may sometimes be \par injudicious, tardiness can never be anything but foolish -- if \par only because it means impoverishment to the nation. In \par considering the point raised here by Sun Tzu, the classic example \par of Fabius Cunctator will inevitably occur to the mind. That \par general deliberately measured the endurance of Rome against that \par of Hannibals's isolated army, because it seemed to him that the \par latter was more likely to suffer from a long campaign in a \par strange country. But it is quite a moot question whether his \par tactics would have proved successful in the long run. Their \par reversal it is true, led to Cannae; but this only establishes a \par negative presumption in their favor.]\par \par 6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from \par prolonged warfare.\par 7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the \par evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of \par carrying it on.\par \par [That is, with rapidity. Only one who knows the disastrous \par effects of a long war can realize the supreme importance of \par rapidity in bringing it to a close. Only two commentators seem \par to favor this interpretation, but it fits well into the logic of \par the context, whereas the rendering, "He who does not know the \par evils of war cannot appreciate its benefits," is distinctly \par pointless.]\par \par 8. The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, \par neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice.\par \par [Once war is declared, he will not waste precious time in \par waiting for reinforcements, nor will he return his army back for \par fresh supplies, but crosses the enemy's frontier without delay. \par This may seem an audacious policy to recommend, but with all \par great strategists, from Julius Caesar to Napoleon Bonaparte, the \par value of time -- that is, being a little ahead of your opponent --\par has counted for more than either numerical superiority or the \par nicest calculations with regard to commissariat.]\par \par 9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the \par enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.\par \par [The Chinese word translated here as "war material" \par literally means "things to be used", and is meant in the widest \par sense. It includes all the impedimenta of an army, apart from \par provisions.]\par \par 10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be \par maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to \par maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be \par impoverished.\par \par [The beginning of this sentence does not balance properly \par with the next, though obviously intended to do so. The \par arrangement, moreover, is so awkward that I cannot help \par suspecting some corruption in the text. It never seems to occur \par to Chinese commentators that an emendation may be necessary for \par the sense, and we get no help from them there. The Chinese words \par Sun Tzu used to indicate the cause of the people's impoverishment \par clearly have reference to some system by which the husbandmen \par sent their contributions of corn to the army direct. But why \par should it fall on them to maintain an army in this way, except \par because the State or Government is too poor to do so?]\par \par 11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes \par prices to go up; and high prices cause the people's substance to \par be drained away.\par \par [Wang Hsi says high prices occur before the army has left \par its own territory. Ts`ao Kung understands it of an army that has \par already crossed the frontier.]\par \par 12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry \par will be afflicted by heavy exactions.\par 13, 14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of \par strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and \par three-tenths of their income will be dissipated;\par \par [Tu Mu and Wang Hsi agree that the people are not mulcted \par not of 3/10, but of 7/10, of their income. But this is hardly to \par be extracted from our text. Ho Shih has a characteristic tag: \par "The PEOPLE being regarded as the essential part of the State, \par and FOOD as the people's heaven, is it not right that those in \par authority should value and be careful of both?"]\par \par while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, \par breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, \par protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to \par four-tenths of its total revenue.\par 15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the \par enemy. One cartload of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to \par twenty of one's own, and likewise a single PICUL of his provender \par is equivalent to twenty from one's own store.\par \par [Because twenty cartloads will be consumed in the process of \par transporting one cartload to the front. A PICUL is a unit of \par measure equal to 133.3 pounds (65.5 kilograms).]\par \par 16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused \par to anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, \par they must have their rewards.\par \par [Tu Mu says: "Rewards are necessary in order to make the \par soldiers see the advantage of beating the enemy; thus, when you \par capture spoils from the enemy, they must be used as rewards, so \par that all your men may have a keen desire to fight, each on his \par own account."]\par \par 17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more \par chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the \par first. Our own flags should be substituted for those of the \par enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with \par ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.\par 18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment \par one's own strength.\par 19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not \par lengthy campaigns.\par \par [As Ho Shih remarks: "War is not a thing to be trifled \par with." Sun Tzu here reiterates the main lesson which this \par chapter is intended to enforce."]\par \par 20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the \par arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it depends whether \par the nation shall be in peace or in peril.\par \par -----------------------------------------------------------------\par \par III. ATTACK BY STRATAGEM\par \par \par 1. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best \par thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to \par shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to \par recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a \par regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them.\par \par [The equivalent to an army corps, according to Ssu-ma Fa, \par consisted nominally of 12500 men; according to Ts`ao Kung, the \par equivalent of a regiment contained 500 men, the equivalent to a \par detachment consists from any number between 100 and 500, and the \par equivalent of a company contains from 5 to 100 men. For the last \par two, however, Chang Yu gives the exact figures of 100 and 5 \par respectively.]\par \par 2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not \par supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the \par enemy's resistance without fighting.\par \par [Here again, no modern strategist but will approve the words \par of the old Chinese general. Moltke's greatest triumph, the \par capitulation of the huge French army at Sedan, was won \par practically without bloodshed.]\par \par 3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the \par enemy's plans; \par \par [Perhaps the word "balk" falls short of expressing the full \par force of the Chinese word, which implies not an attitude of \par defense, whereby one might be content to foil the enemy's \par stratagems one after another, but an active policy of counter-\par attack. Ho Shih puts this very clearly in his note: "When the \par enemy has made a plan of attack against us, we must anticipate \par him by delivering our own attack first."]\par \par the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces;\par \par [Isolating him from his allies. We must not forget that Sun \par Tzu, in speaking of hostilities, always has in mind the numerous \par states or principalities into which the China of his day was \par split up.]\par \par the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field;\par \par [When he is already at full strength.]\par \par and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.\par \par 4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can \par possibly be avoided.\par \par [Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers \par acted upon it in 1899, and refrained from dissipating their \par strength before Kimberley, Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it is \par more than probable that they would have been masters of the \par situation before the British were ready seriously to oppose \par them.]\par \par The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various \par implements of war, will take up three whole months;\par \par [It is not quite clear what the Chinese word, here \par translated as "mantlets", described. Ts`ao Kung simply defines \par them as "large shields," but we get a better idea of them from Li \par Ch`uan, who says they were to protect the heads of those who were \par assaulting the city walls at close quarters. This seems to \par suggest a sort of Roman TESTUDO, ready made. Tu Mu says they \par were wheeled vehicles used in repelling attacks, but this is \par denied by Ch`en Hao. See supra II. 14. The name is also applied \par to turrets on city walls. Of the "movable shelters" we get a \par fairly clear description from several commentators. They were \par wooden missile-proof structures on four wheels, propelled from \par within, covered over with raw hides, and used in sieges to convey \par parties of men to and from the walls, for the purpose of filling \par up the encircling moat with earth. Tu Mu adds that they are now \par called "wooden donkeys."]\par \par and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take \par three months more.\par \par [These were great mounds or ramparts of earth heaped up to \par the level of the enemy's walls in order to discover the weak \par points in the defense, and also to destroy the fortified turrets \par mentioned in the preceding note.]\par \par 5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will \par launch his men to the assault like swarming ants,\par \par [This vivid simile of Ts`ao Kung is taken from the spectacle \par of an army of ants climbing a wall. The meaning is that the \par general, losing patience at the long delay, may make a premature \par attempt to storm the place before his engines of war are ready.]\par \par with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the \par town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a \par siege.\par \par [We are reminded of the terrible losses of the Japanese \par before Port Arthur, in the most recent siege which history has to \par record.]\par \par 6. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy's troops \par without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying \par siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy \par operations in the field.\par \par [Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the Government, but \par does no harm to individuals. The classical instance is Wu Wang, \par who after having put an end to the Yin dynasty was acclaimed \par "Father and mother of the people."]\par \par 7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of \par the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be \par complete.\par \par [Owing to the double meanings in the Chinese text, the \par latter part of the sentence is susceptible of quite a different \par meaning: "And thus, the weapon not being blunted by use, its \par keenness remains perfect."]\par \par This is the method of attacking by stratagem.\par 8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the \par enemy's one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him;\par \par [Straightway, without waiting for any further advantage.]\par \par if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.\par \par [Tu Mu takes exception to the saying; and at first sight, \par indeed, it appears to violate a fundamental principle of war. \par Ts'ao Kung, however, gives a clue to Sun Tzu's meaning: "Being \par two to the enemy's one, we may use one part of our army in the \par regular way, and the other for some special diversion." Chang Yu \par thus further elucidates the point: "If our force is twice as \par numerous as that of the enemy, it should be split up into two \par divisions, one to meet the enemy in front, and one to fall upon \par his rear; if he replies to the frontal attack, he may be crushed \par from behind; if to the rearward attack, he may be crushed in \par front." This is what is meant by saying that 'one part may be \par used in the regular way, and the other for some special \par diversion.' Tu Mu does not understand that dividing one's army \par is simply an irregular, just as concentrating it is the regular, \par strategical method, and he is too hasty in calling this a \par mistake."]\par \par 9. If equally matched, we can offer battle;\par \par [Li Ch`uan, followed by Ho Shih, gives the following \par paraphrase: "If attackers and attacked are equally matched in \par strength, only the able general will fight."]\par \par if slightly inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy;\par \par [The meaning, "we can WATCH the enemy," is certainly a great \par improvement on the above; but unfortunately there appears to be \par no very good authority for the variant. Chang Yu reminds us that \par the saying only applies if the other factors are equal; a small \par difference in numbers is often more than counterbalanced by \par superior energy and discipline.]\par \par if quite unequal in every way, we can flee from him.\par 10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a small \par force, in the end it must be captured by the larger force.\par 11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the \par bulwark is complete at all points; the State will be strong; if \par the bulwark is defective, the State will be weak.\par \par [As Li Ch`uan tersely puts it: "Gap indicates deficiency; \par if the general's ability is not perfect (i.e. if he is not \par thoroughly versed in his profession), his army will lack \par strength."]\par \par 12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring \par misfortune upon his army:--\par 13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to retreat, \par being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey. This is called \par hobbling the army.\par \par [Li Ch`uan adds the comment: "It is like tying together the \par legs of a thoroughbred, so that it is unable to gallop." One \par would naturally think of "the ruler" in this passage as being at \par home, and trying to direct the movements of his army from a \par distance. But the commentators understand just the reverse, and \par quote the saying of T`ai Kung: "A kingdom should not be \par governed from without, and army should not be directed from \par within." Of course it is true that, during an engagement, or \par when in close touch with the enemy, the general should not be in \par the thick of his own troops, but a little distance apart. \par Otherwise, he will be liable to misjudge the position as a whole, \par and give wrong orders.]\par \par 14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same way as \par he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the conditions which \par obtain in an army. This causes restlessness in the soldier's \par minds.\par \par [Ts`ao Kung's note is, freely translated: "The military \par sphere and the civil sphere are wholly distinct; you can't handle \par an army in kid gloves." And Chang Yu says: "Humanity and \par justice are the principles on which to govern a state, but not an \par army; opportunism and flexibility, on the other hand, are \par military rather than civil virtues to assimilate the governing of \par an army"--to that of a State, understood.]\par \par 15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without \par discrimination,\par \par [That is, he is not careful to use the right man in the \par right place.]\par \par through ignorance of the military principle of adaptation to \par circumstances. This shakes the confidence of the soldiers.\par \par [I follow Mei Yao-ch`en here. The other commentators refer \par not to the ruler, as in SS. 13, 14, but to the officers he \par employs. Thus Tu Yu says: "If a general is ignorant of the \par principle of adaptability, he must not be entrusted with a \par position of authority." Tu Mu quotes: "The skillful employer of \par men will employ the wise man, the brave man, the covetous man, \par and the stupid man. For the wise man delights in establishing \par his merit, the brave man likes to show his courage in action, the \par covetous man is quick at seizing advantages, and the stupid man \par has no fear of death."]\par \par 16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble \par is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This is simply \par bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging victory away.\par 17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials for \par victory: (1) He will win who knows when to fight and when not to \par fight.\par \par [Chang Yu says: If he can fight, he advances and takes the \par offensive; if he cannot fight, he retreats and remains on the \par defensive. He will invariably conquer who knows whether it is \par right to take the offensive or the defensive.]\par \par (2) He will win who knows how to handle both superior and \par inferior forces.\par \par [This is not merely the general's ability to estimate \par numbers correctly, as Li Ch`uan and others make out. Chang Yu \par expounds the saying more satisfactorily: "By applying the art of \par war, it is possible with a lesser force to defeat a greater, and \par vice versa. The secret lies in an eye for locality, and in not \par letting the right moment slip. Thus Wu Tzu says: 'With a \par superior force, make for easy ground; with an inferior one, make \par for difficult ground.'"]\par \par (3) He will win whose army is animated by the same spirit \par throughout all its ranks.\par (4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take the \par enemy unprepared.\par (5) He will win who has military capacity and is not \par interfered with by the sovereign.\par \par [Tu Yu quotes Wang Tzu as saying: "It is the sovereign's \par function to give broad instructions, but to decide on battle it \par is the function of the general." It is needless to dilate on the \par military disasters which have been caused by undue interference \par with operations in the field on the part of the home government. \par Napoleon undoubtedly owed much of his extraordinary success to \par the fact that he was not hampered by central authority.]\par \par 18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know \par yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If \par you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you \par will also suffer a defeat.\par \par [Li Ch`uan cites the case of Fu Chien, prince of Ch`in, who \par in 383 A.D. marched with a vast army against the Chin Emperor. \par When warned not to despise an enemy who could command the \par services of such men as Hsieh An and Huan Ch`ung, he boastfully \par replied: "I have the population of eight provinces at my back, \par infantry and horsemen to the number of one million; why, they \par could dam up the Yangtsze River itself by merely throwing their \par whips into the stream. What danger have I to fear?" \par Nevertheless, his forces were soon after disastrously routed at \par the Fei River, and he was obliged to beat a hasty retreat.]\par \par If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in \par every battle.\par \par [Chang Yu said: "Knowing the enemy enables you to take the \par offensive, knowing yourself enables you to stand on the \par defensive." He adds: "Attack is the secret of defense; defense \par is the planning of an attack." It would be hard to find a better \par epitome of the root-principle of war.]\par \par -----------------------------------------------------------------\par \par IV. TACTICAL DISPOSITIONS\par \par \par [Ts`ao Kung explains the Chinese meaning of the words for \par the title of this chapter: "marching and countermarching on the \par part of the two armies with a view to discovering each other's \par condition." Tu Mu says: "It is through the dispositions of an \par army that its condition may be discovered. Conceal your \par dispositions, and your condition will remain secret, which leads \par to victory,; show your dispositions, and your condition will \par become patent, which leads to defeat." Wang Hsi remarks that the \par good general can "secure success by modifying his tactics to meet \par those of the enemy."]\par \par 1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put \par themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for \par an opportunity of defeating the enemy.\par 2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own \par hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by \par the enemy himself.\par \par [That is, of course, by a mistake on the enemy's part.]\par \par 3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against \par defeat,\par \par [Chang Yu says this is done, "By concealing the disposition \par of his troops, covering up his tracks, and taking unremitting \par precautions."]\par \par but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy.\par 4. Hence the saying: One may KNOW how to conquer without \par being able to DO it.\par 5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; \par ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.\par \par [I retain the sense found in a similar passage in ss. 1-3, \par in spite of the fact that the commentators are all against me. \par The meaning they give, "He who cannot conquer takes the \par defensive," is plausible enough.]\par \par 6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient \par strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.\par 7. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most \par secret recesses of the earth;\par \par [Literally, "hides under the ninth earth," which is a \par metaphor indicating the utmost secrecy and concealment, so that \par the enemy may not know his whereabouts."]\par \par he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost \par heights of heaven.\par \par [Another metaphor, implying that he falls on his adversary \par like a thunderbolt, against which there is no time to prepare. \par This is the opinion of most of the commentators.]\par \par Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the \par other, a victory that is complete.\par 8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the \par common herd is not the acme of excellence.\par \par [As Ts`ao Kung remarks, "the thing is to see the plant \par before it has germinated," to foresee the event before the action \par has begun. Li Ch`uan alludes to the story of Han Hsin who, when \par about to attack the vastly superior army of Chao, which was \par strongly entrenched in the city of Ch`eng-an, said to his \par officers: "Gentlemen, we are going to annihilate the enemy, and \par shall meet again at dinner." The officers hardly took his words \par seriously, and gave a very dubious assent. But Han Hsin had \par already worked out in his mind the details of a clever stratagem, \par whereby, as he foresaw, he was able to capture the city and \par inflict a crushing defeat on his adversary."]\par \par 9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and \par conquer and the whole Empire says, "Well done!"\par \par [True excellence being, as Tu Mu says: "To plan secretly, \par to move surreptitiously, to foil the enemy's intentions and balk \par his schemes, so that at last the day may be won without shedding \par a drop of blood." Sun Tzu reserves his approbation for things \par that\par "the world's coarse thumb\par And finger fail to plumb."]\par \par 10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength;\par \par ["Autumn" hair" is explained as the fur of a hare, which is \par finest in autumn, when it begins to grow afresh. The phrase is a \par very common one in Chinese writers.]\par \par to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to hear the \par noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.\par \par [Ho Shih gives as real instances of strength, sharp sight \par and quick hearing: Wu Huo, who could lift a tripod weighing 250 \par stone; Li Chu, who at a distance of a hundred paces could see \par objects no bigger than a mustard seed; and Shih K`uang, a blind \par musician who could hear the footsteps of a mosquito.]\par \par 11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who \par not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.\par \par [The last half is literally "one who, conquering, excels in \par easy conquering." Mei Yao-ch`en says: "He who only sees the \par obvious, wins his battles with difficulty; he who looks below the \par surface of things, wins with ease."]\par \par 12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for \par wisdom nor credit for courage.\par \par [Tu Mu explains this very well: "Inasmuch as his victories \par are gained over circumstances that have not come to light, the \par world as large knows nothing of them, and he wins no reputation \par for wisdom; inasmuch as the hostile state submits before there \par has been any bloodshed, he receives no credit for courage."]\par \par 13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes.\par \par [Ch`en Hao says: "He plans no superfluous marches, he \par devises no futile attacks." The connection of ideas is thus \par explained by Chang Yu: "One who seeks to conquer by sheer \par strength, clever though he may be at winning pitched battles, is \par also liable on occasion to be vanquished; whereas he who can look \par into the future and discern conditions that are not yet manifest, \par will never make a blunder and therefore invariably win."]\par \par Making no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory, \par for it means conquering an enemy that is already defeated.\par 14. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position \par which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss the moment for \par defeating the enemy.\par \par [A "counsel of perfection" as Tu Mu truly observes. \par "Position" need not be confined to the actual ground occupied by \par the troops. It includes all the arrangements and preparations \par which a wise general will make to increase the safety of his \par army.]\par \par 15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only \par seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he who is \par destined to defeat first fights and afterwards looks for victory.\par \par [Ho Shih thus expounds the paradox: "In warfare, first lay \par plans which will ensure victory, and then lead your army to \par battle; if you will not begin with stratagem but rely on brute \par strength alone, victory will no longer be assured."]\par \par 16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law, and \par strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is in his \par power to control success.\par 17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly, \par Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly, \par Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly, Victory.\par 18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth; Estimation of \par quantity to Measurement; Calculation to Estimation of quantity; \par Balancing of chances to Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of \par chances.\par \par [It is not easy to distinguish the four terms very clearly \par in the Chinese. The first seems to be surveying and measurement \par of the ground, which enable us to form an estimate of the enemy's \par strength, and to make calculations based on the data thus \par obtained; we are thus led to a general weighing-up, or comparison \par of the enemy's chances with our own; if the latter turn the \par scale, then victory ensues. The chief difficulty lies in third \par term, which in the Chinese some commentators take as a \par calculation of NUMBERS, thereby making it nearly synonymous with \par the second term. Perhaps the second term should be thought of as \par a consideration of the enemy's general position or condition, \par while the third term is the estimate of his numerical strength. \par On the other hand, Tu Mu says: "The question of relative \par strength having been settled, we can bring the varied resources \par of cunning into play." Ho Shih seconds this interpretation, but \par weakens it. However, it points to the third term as being a \par calculation of numbers.]\par \par 19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is as a \par pound's weight placed in the scale against a single grain.\par \par [Literally, "a victorious army is like an I (20 oz.) weighed \par against a SHU (1/24 oz.); a routed army is a SHU weighed against \par an I." The point is simply the enormous advantage which a \par disciplined force, flushed with victory, has over one demoralized \par by defeat." Legge, in his note on Mencius, I. 2. ix. 2, makes \par the I to be 24 Chinese ounces, and corrects Chu Hsi's statement \par that it equaled 20 oz. only. But Li Ch`uan of the T`ang dynasty \par here gives the same figure as Chu Hsi.]\par \par 20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting \par of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms deep.\par \par -----------------------------------------------------------------\par \par V. ENERGY\par \par \par 1. Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same \par principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question \par of dividing up their numbers.\par \par [That is, cutting up the army into regiments, companies, \par etc., with subordinate officers in command of each. Tu Mu \par reminds us of Han Hsin's famous reply to the first Han Emperor, \par who once said to him: "How large an army do you think I could \par lead?" "Not more than 100,000 men, your Majesty." "And you?" \par asked the Emperor. "Oh!" he answered, "the more the better."]\par \par 2. Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise \par different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a \par question of instituting signs and signals.\par 3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt \par of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken - this is effected by \par maneuvers direct and indirect.\par \par [We now come to one of the most interesting parts of Sun \par Tzu's treatise, the discussion of the CHENG and the CH`I." As it \par is by no means easy to grasp the full significance of these two \par terms, or to render them consistently by good English \par equivalents; it may be as well to tabulate some of the \par commentators' remarks on the subject before proceeding further. \par Li Ch`uan: "Facing the enemy is CHENG, making lateral diversion \par is CH`I. Chia Lin: "In presence of the enemy, your troops \par should be arrayed in normal fashion, but in order to secure \par victory abnormal maneuvers must be employed." Mei Yao-ch`en: \par "CH`I is active, CHENG is passive; passivity means waiting for an \par opportunity, activity beings the victory itself." Ho Shih: "We \par must cause the enemy to regard our straightforward attack as one \par that is secretly designed, and vice versa; thus CHENG may also be \par CH`I, and CH`I may also be CHENG." He instances the famous \par exploit of Han Hsin, who when marching ostensibly against Lin-\par chin (now Chao-i in Shensi), suddenly threw a large force across \par the Yellow River in wooden tubs, utterly disconcerting his \par opponent. [Ch`ien Han Shu, ch. 3.] Here, we are told, the march \par on Lin-chin was CHENG, and the surprise maneuver was CH`I." \par Chang Yu gives the following summary of opinions on the words: \par "Military writers do not agree with regard to the meaning of CH`I \par and CHENG. Wei Liao Tzu [4th cent. B.C.] says: 'Direct warfare \par favors frontal attacks, indirect warfare attacks from the rear.' \par Ts`ao Kung says: 'Going straight out to join battle is a direct \par operation; appearing on the enemy's rear is an indirect \par maneuver.' Li Wei-kung [6th and 7th cent. A.D.] says: 'In war, \par to march straight ahead is CHENG; turning movements, on the other \par hand, are CH`I.' These writers simply regard CHENG as CHENG, and \par CH`I as CH`I; they do not note that the two are mutually \par interchangeable and run into each other like the two sides of a \par circle [see infra, ss. 11]. A comment on the T`ang Emperor T`ai \par Tsung goes to the root of the matter: 'A CH`I maneuver may be \par CHENG, if we make the enemy look upon it as CHENG; then our real \par attack will be CH`I, and vice versa. The whole secret lies in \par confusing the enemy, so that he cannot fathom our real intent.'" \par To put it perhaps a little more clearly: any attack or other \par operation is CHENG, on which the enemy has had his attention \par fixed; whereas that is CH`I," which takes him by surprise or \par comes from an unexpected quarter. If the enemy perceives a \par movement which is meant to be CH`I," it immediately becomes \par CHENG."]\par \par 4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone \par dashed against an egg - this is effected by the science of weak \par points and strong.\par 5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for \par joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to \par secure victory.\par \par [Chang Yu says: "Steadily develop indirect tactics, either \par by pounding the enemy's flanks or falling on his rear." A \par brilliant example of "indirect tactics" which decided the \par fortunes of a campaign was Lord Roberts' night march round the \par Peiwar Kotal in the second Afghan war. [1]\par \par 6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhausible \par as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; \par like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four \par seasons, they pass away to return once more.\par \par [Tu Yu and Chang Yu understand this of the permutations of \par CH`I and CHENG." But at present Sun Tzu is not speaking of CHENG \par at all, unless, indeed, we suppose with Cheng Yu-hsien that a \par clause relating to it has fallen out of the text. Of course, as \par has already been pointed out, the two are so inextricably \par interwoven in all military operations, that they cannot really be \par considered apart. Here we simply have an expression, in \par figurative language, of the almost infinite resource of a great \par leader.]\par \par 7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the \par combinations of these five give rise to more melodies than can \par ever be heard.\par 8. There are not more than five primary colors (blue, \par yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination they produce \par more hues than can ever been seen.\par 9 There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour, \par acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them yield more \par flavors than can ever be tasted.\par 10. In battle, there are not more than two methods of \par attack - the direct and the indirect; yet these two in \par combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers.\par 11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in \par turn. It is like moving in a circle - you never come to an end. \par Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?\par 12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent which \par will even roll stones along in its course.\par 13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop of \par a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim.\par \par [The Chinese here is tricky and a certain key word in the \par context it is used defies the best efforts of the translator. Tu \par Mu defines this word as "the measurement or estimation of \par distance." But this meaning does not quite fit the illustrative \par simile in ss. 15. Applying this definition to the falcon, it \par seems to me to denote that instinct of SELF RESTRAINT which keeps \par the bird from swooping on its quarry until the right moment, \par together with the power of judging when the right moment has \par arrived. The analogous quality in soldiers is the highly \par important one of being able to reserve their fire until the very \par instant at which it will be most effective. When the "Victory" \par went into action at Trafalgar at hardly more than drifting pace, \par she was for several minutes exposed to a storm of shot and shell \par before replying with a single gun. Nelson coolly waited until he \par was within close range, when the broadside he brought to bear \par worked fearful havoc on the enemy's nearest ships.]\par \par 14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his \par onset, and prompt in his decision.\par \par [The word "decision" would have reference to the measurement \par of distance mentioned above, letting the enemy get near before \par striking. But I cannot help thinking that Sun Tzu meant to use \par the word in a figurative sense comparable to our own idiom "short \par and sharp." Cf. Wang Hsi's note, which after describing the \par falcon's mode of attack, proceeds: "This is just how the \par 'psychological moment' should be seized in war."]\par \par 15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow; \par decision, to the releasing of a trigger.\par \par [None of the commentators seem to grasp the real point of \par the simile of energy and the force stored up in the bent cross-\par bow until released by the finger on the trigger.]\par \par 16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be \par seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid confusion \par and chaos, your array may be without head or tail, yet it will be \par proof against defeat.\par \par [Mei Yao-ch`en says: "The subdivisions of the army having \par been previously fixed, and the various signals agreed upon, the \par separating and joining, the dispersing and collecting which will \par take place in the course of a battle, may give the appearance of \par disorder when no real disorder is possible. Your formation may \par be without head or tail, your dispositions all topsy-turvy, and \par yet a rout of your forces quite out of the question."]\par \par 17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline, \par simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness postulates \par strength.\par \par [In order to make the translation intelligible, it is \par necessary to tone down the sharply paradoxical form of the \par original. Ts`ao Kung throws out a hint of the meaning in his \par brief note: "These things all serve to destroy formation and \par conceal one's condition." But Tu Mu is the first to put it quite \par plainly: "If you wish to feign confusion in order to lure the \par enemy on, you must first have perfect discipline; if you wish to \par display timidity in order to entrap the enemy, you must have \par extreme courage; if you wish to parade your weakness in order to \par make the enemy over-confident, you must have exceeding \par strength."]\par \par 18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply a \par question of subdivision;\par \par [See supra, ss. 1.]\par \par concealing courage under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of \par latent energy;\par \par [The commentators strongly understand a certain Chinese word \par here differently than anywhere else in this chapter. Thus Tu Mu \par says: "seeing that we are favorably circumstanced and yet make \par no move, the enemy will believe that we are really afraid."]\par \par masking strength with weakness is to be effected by tactical \par dispositions.\par \par [Chang Yu relates the following anecdote of Kao Tsu, the \par first Han Emperor: "Wishing to crush the Hsiung-nu, he sent out \par spies to report on their condition. But the Hsiung-nu, \par forewarned, carefully concealed all their able-bodied men and \par well-fed horses, and only allowed infirm soldiers and emaciated \par cattle to be seen. The result was that spies one and all \par recommended the Emperor to deliver his attack. Lou Ching alone \par opposed them, saying: "When two countries go to war, they are \par naturally inclined to make an ostentatious display of their \par strength. Yet our spies have seen nothing but old age and \par infirmity. This is surely some ruse on the part of the enemy, \par and it would be unwise for us to attack." The Emperor, however, \par disregarding this advice, fell into the trap and found himself \par surrounded at Po-teng."]\par \par 19. Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on the \par move maintains deceitful appearances, according to which the \par enemy will act.\par \par [Ts`ao Kung's note is "Make a display of weakness and want." \par Tu Mu says: "If our force happens to be superior to the enemy's, \par weakness may be simulated in order to lure him on; but if \par inferior, he must be led to believe that we are strong, in order \par that he may keep off. In fact, all the enemy's movements should \par be determined by the signs that we choose to give him." Note the \par following anecdote of Sun Pin, a descendent of Sun Wu: In 341 \par B.C., the Ch`i State being at war with Wei, sent T`ien Chi and \par Sun Pin against the general P`ang Chuan, who happened to be a \par deadly personal enemy of the later. Sun Pin said: "The Ch`i \par State has a reputation for cowardice, and therefore our adversary \par despises us. Let us turn this circumstance to account." \par Accordingly, when the army had crossed the border into Wei \par territory, he gave orders to show 100,000 fires on the first \par night, 50,000 on the next, and the night after only 20,000. \par P`ang Chuan pursued them hotly, saying to himself: "I knew these \par men of Ch`i were cowards: their numbers have already fallen away \par by more than half." In his retreat, Sun Pin came to a narrow \par defile, with he calculated that his pursuers would reach after \par dark. Here he had a tree stripped of its bark, and inscribed \par upon it the words: "Under this tree shall P`ang Chuan die." \par Then, as night began to fall, he placed a strong body of archers \par in ambush near by, with orders to shoot directly they saw a \par light. Later on, P`ang Chuan arrived at the spot, and noticing \par the tree, struck a light in order to read what was written on it. \par His body was immediately riddled by a volley of arrows, and his \par whole army thrown into confusion. [The above is Tu Mu's version \par of the story; the SHIH CHI, less dramatically but probably with \par more historical truth, makes P`ang Chuan cut his own throat with \par an exclamation of despair, after the rout of his army.] ]\par \par He sacrifices something, that the enemy may snatch at it.\par \par 20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march; then \par with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him.\par \par [With an emendation suggested by Li Ching, this then reads, \par "He lies in wait with the main body of his troops."]\par \par 21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined \par energy, and does not require too much from individuals.\par \par [Tu Mu says: "He first of all considers the power of his \par army in the bulk; afterwards he takes individual talent into \par account, and uses each men according to his capabilities. He \par does not demand perfection from the untalented."]\par \par Hence his ability to pick out the right men and utilize combined \par energy.\par 22. When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting men \par become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones. For it is \par the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless on level \par ground, and to move when on a slope; if four-cornered, to come to \par a standstill, but if round-shaped, to go rolling down.\par \par [Ts`au Kung calls this "the use of natural or inherent \par power."]\par \par 23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is as \par the momentum of a round stone rolled down a mountain thousands \par of feet in height. So much on the subject of energy.\par \par [The chief lesson of this chapter, in Tu Mu's opinion, is \par the paramount importance in war of rapid evolutions and sudden \par rushes. "Great results," he adds, "can thus be achieved with \par small forces."]\par \par \par [1] "Forty-one Years in India," chapter 46.\par \par -----------------------------------------------------------------\par \par VI. WEAK POINTS AND STRONG\par \par \par [Chang Yu attempts to explain the sequence of chapters as \par follows: "Chapter IV, on Tactical Dispositions, treated of the \par offensive and the defensive; chapter V, on Energy, dealt with \par direct and indirect methods. The good general acquaints himself \par first with the theory of attack and defense, and then turns his \par attention to direct and indirect methods. He studies the art of \par varying and combining these two methods before proceeding to the \par subject of weak and strong points. For the use of direct or \par indirect methods arises out of attack and defense, and the \par perception of weak and strong points depends again on the above \par methods. Hence the present chapter comes immediately after the \par chapter on Energy."]\par \par 1. Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits \par the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is \par second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive \par exhausted.\par 2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the \par enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him.\par \par [One mark of a great soldier is that he fight on his own \par terms or fights not at all. [1] ]\par \par 3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy \par to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can \par make it impossible for the enemy to draw near.\par \par [In the first case, he will entice him with a bait; in the \par second, he will strike at some important point which the enemy \par will have to defend.]\par \par 4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him;\par \par [This passage may be cited as evidence against Mei Yao-\par Ch`en's interpretation of I. ss. 23.]\par \par if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly \par encamped, he can force him to move.\par 5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; \par march swiftly to places where you are not expected.\par 6. An army may march great distances without distress, if \par it marches through country where the enemy is not.\par \par [Ts`ao Kung sums up very well: "Emerge from the void [q.d. \par like "a bolt from the blue"], strike at vulnerable points, shun \par places that are defended, attack in unexpected quarters."]\par \par 7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you \par only attack places which are undefended.\par \par [Wang Hsi explains "undefended places" as "weak points; that \par is to say, where the general is lacking in capacity, or the \par soldiers in spirit; where the walls are not strong enough, or the \par precautions not strict enough; where relief comes too late, or \par provisions are too scanty, or the defenders are variance amongst \par themselves."]\par \par You can ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold \par positions that cannot be attacked.\par \par [I.e., where there are none of the weak points mentioned \par above. There is rather a nice point involved in the \par interpretation of this later clause. Tu Mu, Ch`en Hao, and Mei \par Yao-ch`en assume the meaning to be: "In order to make your \par defense quite safe, you must defend EVEN those places that are \par not likely to be attacked;" and Tu Mu adds: "How much more, \par then, those that will be attacked." Taken thus, however, the \par clause balances less well with the preceding--always a \par consideration in the highly antithetical style which is natural \par to the Chinese. Chang Yu, therefore, seems to come nearer the \par mark in saying: "He who is skilled in attack flashes forth from \par the topmost heights of heaven [see IV. ss. 7], making it \par impossible for the enemy to guard against him. This being so, \par the places that I shall attack are precisely those that the enemy \par cannot defend.... He who is skilled in defense hides in the most \par secret recesses of the earth, making it impossible for the enemy \par to estimate his whereabouts. This being so, the places that I \par shall hold are precisely those that the enemy cannot attack."]\par \par 8. Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent \par does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in defense whose \par opponent does not know what to attack.\par \par [An aphorism which puts the whole art of war in a nutshell.]\par \par 9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you we \par learn to be invisible, through you inaudible;\par \par [Literally, "without form or sound," but it is said of \par course with reference to the enemy.]\par \par and hence we can hold the enemy's fate in our hands.\par 10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if you \par make for the enemy's weak points; you may retire and be safe from \par pursuit if your movements are more rapid than those of the enemy.\par 11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an \par engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high rampart and \par a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some other place that he \par will be obliged to relieve.\par \par [Tu Mu says: "If the enemy is the invading party, we can \par cut his line of communications and occupy the roads by which he \par will have to return; if we are the invaders, we may direct our \par attack against the sovereign himself." It is clear that Sun Tzu, \par unlike certain generals in the late Boer war, was no believer in \par frontal attacks.]\par \par 12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the enemy \par from engaging us even though the lines of our encampment be \par merely traced out on the ground. All we need do is to throw \par something odd and unaccountable in his way.\par \par [This extremely concise expression is intelligibly \par paraphrased by Chia Lin: "even though we have constructed \par neither wall nor ditch." Li Ch`uan says: "we puzzle him by \par strange and unusual dispositions;" and Tu Mu finally clinches the \par meaning by three illustrative anecdotes--one of Chu-ko Liang, who \par when occupying Yang-p`ing and about to be attacked by Ssu-ma I, \par suddenly struck his colors, stopped the beating of the drums, and \par flung open the city gates, showing only a few men engaged in \par sweeping and sprinkling the ground. This unexpected proceeding \par had the intended effect; for Ssu-ma I, suspecting an ambush, \par actually drew off his army and retreated. What Sun Tzu is \par advocating here, therefore, is nothing more nor less than the \par timely use of "bluff."]\par \par 13. By discovering the enemy's dispositions and remaining \par invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces concentrated, while \par the enemy's must be divided.\par \par [The conclusion is perhaps not very obvious, but Chang Yu \par (after Mei Yao-ch`en) rightly explains it thus: "If the enemy's \par dispositions are visible, we can make for him in one body; \par whereas, our own dispositions being kept secret, the enemy will \par be obliged to divide his forces in order to guard against attack \par from every quarter."]\par \par 14. We can form a single united body, while the enemy must \par split up into fractions. Hence there will be a whole pitted \par against separate parts of a whole, which means that we shall be \par many to the enemy's few.\par 15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force \par with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire straits.\par 16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made \par known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against a possible \par attack at several different points;\par \par [Sheridan once explained the reason of General Grant's \par victories by saying that "while his opponents were kept fully \par employed wondering what he was going to do, HE was thinking most \par of what he was going to do himself."]\par \par and his forces being thus distributed in many directions, the \par numbers we shall have to face at any given point will be \par proportionately few.\par 17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will weaken \par his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will weaken his van; \par should he strengthen his left, he will weaken his right; should \par he strengthen his right, he will weaken his left. If he sends \par reinforcements everywhere, he will everywhere be weak.\par \par [In Frederick the Great's INSTRUCTIONS TO HIS GENERALS we \par read: "A defensive war is apt to betray us into too frequent \par detachment. Those generals who have had but little experience \par attempt to protect every point, while those who are better \par acquainted with their profession, having only the capital object \par in view, guard against a decisive blow, and acquiesce in small \par misfortunes to avoid greater."]\par \par 18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare against \par possible attacks; numerical strength, from compelling our \par adversary to make these preparations against us.\par \par [The highest generalship, in Col. Henderson's words, is "to \par compel the enemy to disperse his army, and then to concentrate \par superior force against each fraction in turn."]\par \par 19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle, we \par may concentrate from the greatest distances in order to fight.\par \par [What Sun Tzu evidently has in mind is that nice calculation \par of distances and that masterly employment of strategy which \par enable a general to divide his army for the purpose of a long and \par rapid march, and afterwards to effect a junction at precisely the \par right spot and the right hour in order to confront the enemy in \par overwhelming strength. Among many such successful junctions \par which military history records, one of the most dramatic and \par decisive was the appearance of Blucher just at the critical \par moment on the field of Waterloo.]\par \par 20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left \par wing will be impotent to succor the right, the right equally \par impotent to succor the left, the van unable to relieve the rear, \par or the rear to support the van. How much more so if the furthest \par portions of the army are anything under a hundred LI apart, and \par even the nearest are separated by several LI!\par \par [The Chinese of this last sentence is a little lacking in \par precision, but the mental picture we are required to draw is \par probably that of an army advancing towards a given rendezvous in \par separate columns, each of which has orders to be there on a fixed \par date. If the general allows the various detachments to proceed \par at haphazard, without precise instructions as to the time and \par place of meeting, the enemy will be able to annihilate the army \par in detail. Chang Yu's note may be worth quoting here: "If we do \par not know the place where our opponents mean to concentrate or the \par day on which they will join battle, our unity will be forfeited \par through our preparations for defense, and the positions we hold \par will be insecure. Suddenly happening upon a powerful foe, we \par shall be brought to battle in a flurried condition, and no mutual \par support will be possible between wings, vanguard or rear, \par especially if there is any great distance between the foremost \par and hindmost divisions of the army."]\par \par 21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of Yueh \par exceed our own in number, that shall advantage them nothing in \par the matter of victory. I say then that victory can be achieved.\par \par [Alas for these brave words! The long feud between the two \par states ended in 473 B.C. with the total defeat of Wu by Kou Chien \par and its incorporation in Yueh. This was doubtless long after Sun \par Tzu's death. With his present assertion compare IV. ss. 4. \par Chang Yu is the only one to point out the seeming discrepancy, \par which he thus goes on to explain: "In the chapter on Tactical \par Dispositions it is said, 'One may KNOW how to conquer without \par being able to DO it,' whereas here we have the statement that \par 'victory' can be achieved.' The explanation is, that in the \par former chapter, where the offensive and defensive are under \par discussion, it is said that if the enemy is fully prepared, one \par cannot make certain of beating him. But the present passage \par refers particularly to the soldiers of Yueh who, according to Sun \par Tzu's calculations, will be kept in ignorance of the time and \par place of the impending struggle. That is why he says here that \par victory can be achieved."]\par \par 22. Though the enemy be stronger in numbers, we may prevent \par him from fighting. Scheme so as to discover his plans and the \par likelihood of their success.\par \par [An alternative reading offered by Chia Lin is: "Know \par beforehand all plans conducive to our success and to the enemy's \par failure."\par \par 23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or \par inactivity.\par \par [Chang Yu tells us that by noting the joy or anger shown by \par the enemy on being thus disturbed, we shall be able to conclude \par whether his policy is to lie low or the reverse. He instances \par the action of Cho-ku Liang, who sent the scornful present of a \par woman's head-dress to Ssu-ma I, in order to goad him out of his \par Fabian tactics.]\par \par Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out his vulnerable \par spots.\par 24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your own, so \par that you may know where strength is superabundant and where it is \par deficient.\par \par [Cf. IV. ss. 6.]\par \par 25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch you \par can attain is to conceal them;\par \par [The piquancy of the paradox evaporates in translation. \par Concealment is perhaps not so much actual invisibility (see supra \par ss. 9) as "showing no sign" of what you mean to do, of the plans \par that are formed in your brain.]\par \par conceal your dispositions, and you will be safe from the prying \par of the subtlest spies, from the machinations of the wisest \par brains.\par \par [Tu Mu explains: "Though the enemy may have clever and \par capable officers, they will not be able to lay any plans against \par us."]\par \par 26. How victory may be produced for them out of the enemy's \par own tactics--that is what the multitude cannot comprehend.\par 27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but what \par none can see is the strategy out of which victory is evolved.\par \par [I.e., everybody can see superficially how a battle is won; \par what they cannot see is the long series of plans and combinations \par which has preceded the battle.]\par \par 28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you one \par victory, but let your methods be regulated by the infinite \par variety of circumstances.\par \par [As Wang Hsi sagely remarks: "There is but one root-\par principle underlying victory, but the tactics which lead up to it \par are infinite in number." With this compare Col. Henderson: "The \par rules of strategy are few and simple. They may be learned in a \par week. They may be taught by familiar illustrations or a dozen \par diagrams. But such knowledge will no more teach a man to lead an \par army like Napoleon than a knowledge of grammar will teach him to \par write like Gibbon."]\par \par 29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its \par natural course runs away from high places and hastens downwards.\par 30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to \par strike at what is weak.\par \par [Like water, taking the line of least resistance.]\par \par 31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of the \par ground over which it flows; the soldier works out his victory in \par relation to the foe whom he is facing.\par 32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape, so \par in warfare there are no constant conditions.\par 33. He who can modify his tactics in relation to his \par opponent and thereby succeed in winning, may be called a heaven-\par born captain.\par 34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth) are \par not always equally predominant;\par \par [That is, as Wang Hsi says: "they predominate \par alternately."]\par \par the four seasons make way for each other in turn.\par \par [Literally, "have no invariable seat."]\par \par There are short days and long; the moon has its periods of waning \par and waxing.\par \par [Cf. V. ss. 6. The purport of the passage is simply to \par illustrate the want of fixity in war by the changes constantly \par taking place in Nature. The comparison is not very happy, \par however, because the regularity of the phenomena which Sun Tzu \par mentions is by no means paralleled in war.]\par \par \par [1] See Col. Henderson's biography of Stonewall Jackson, 1902 \par ed., vol. II, p. 490.\par \par -----------------------------------------------------------------\par \par VII. MANEUVERING\par \par \par 1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands \par from the sovereign.\par 2. Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he \par must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof before \par pitching his camp.\par \par ["Chang Yu says: "the establishment of harmony and \par confidence between the higher and lower ranks before venturing \par into the field;" and he quotes a saying of Wu Tzu (chap. 1 ad \par init.): "Without harmony in the State, no military expedition \par can be undertaken; without harmony in the army, no battle array \par can be formed." In an historical romance Sun Tzu is represented \par as saying to Wu Yuan: "As a general rule, those who are waging \par war should get rid of all the domestic troubles before proceeding \par to attack the external foe."]\par \par 3. After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there \par is nothing more difficult.\par \par [I have departed slightly from the traditional \par interpretation of Ts`ao Kung, who says: "From the time of \par receiving the sovereign's instructions until our encampment over \par against the enemy, the tactics to be pursued are most difficult." \par It seems to me that the tactics or maneuvers can hardly be said \par to begin until the army has sallied forth and encamped, and \par Ch`ien Hao's note gives color to this view: "For levying, \par concentrating, harmonizing and entrenching an army, there are \par plenty of old rules which will serve. The real difficulty comes \par when we engage in tactical operations." Tu Yu also observes that \par "the great difficulty is to be beforehand with the enemy in \par seizing favorable position."]\par \par The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the \par devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain.\par \par [This sentence contains one of those highly condensed and \par somewhat enigmatical expressions of which Sun Tzu is so fond. \par This is how it is explained by Ts`ao Kung: "Make it appear that \par you are a long way off, then cover the distance rapidly and \par arrive on the scene before your opponent." Tu Mu says: \par "Hoodwink the enemy, so that he may be remiss and leisurely while \par you are dashing along with utmost speed." Ho Shih gives a \par slightly different turn: "Although you may have difficult ground \par to traverse and natural obstacles to encounter this is a drawback \par which can be turned into actual advantage by celerity of \par movement." Signal examples of this saying are afforded by the \par two famous passages across the Alps--that of Hannibal, which laid \par Italy at his mercy, and that of Napoleon two thousand years \par later, which resulted in the great victory of Marengo.]\par \par 4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after \par enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting after him, \par to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the \par artifice of DEVIATION.\par \par [Tu Mu cites the famous march of Chao She in 270 B.C. to \par relieve the town of O-yu, which was closely invested by a Ch`in \par army. The King of Chao first consulted Lien P`o on the \par advisability of attempting a relief, but the latter thought the \par distance too great, and the intervening country too rugged and \par difficult. His Majesty then turned to Chao She, who fully \par admitted the hazardous nature of the march, but finally said: \par "We shall be like two rats fighting in a whole--and the pluckier \par one will win!" So he left the capital with his army, but had \par only gone a distance of 30 LI when he stopped and began \par throwing up entrenchments. For 28 days he continued \par strengthening his fortifications, and took care that spies should \par carry the intelligence to the enemy. The Ch`in general was \par overjoyed, and attributed his adversary's tardiness to the fact \par that the beleaguered city was in the Han State, and thus not \par actually part of Chao territory. But the spies had no sooner \par departed than Chao She began a forced march lasting for two days \par and one night, and arrive on the scene of action with such \par astonishing rapidity that he was able to occupy a commanding \par position on the "North hill" before the enemy had got wind of his \par movements. A crushing defeat followed for the Ch`in forces, who \par were obliged to raise the siege of O-yu in all haste and retreat \par across the border.]\par \par 5. Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an \par undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.\par \par [I adopt the reading of the T`UNG TIEN, Cheng Yu-hsien and \par the T`U SHU, since they appear to apply the exact nuance required \par in order to make sense. The commentators using the standard text \par take this line to mean that maneuvers may be profitable, or they \par may be dangerous: it all depends on the ability of the general.]\par \par 6. If you set a fully equipped army in march in order to \par snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be too late. \par On the other hand, to detach a flying column for the purpose \par involves the sacrifice of its baggage and stores.\par \par [Some of the Chinese text is unintelligible to the Chinese \par commentators, who paraphrase the sentence. I submit my own \par rendering without much enthusiasm, being convinced that there is \par some deep-seated corruption in the text. On the whole, it is \par clear that Sun Tzu does not approve of a lengthy march being \par undertaken without supplies. Cf. infra, ss. 11.]\par \par 7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff-coats, \par and make forced marches without halting day or night, covering \par double the usual distance at a stretch,\par \par [The ordinary day's march, according to Tu Mu, was 30 LI; \par but on one occasion, when pursuing Liu Pei, Ts`ao Ts`ao is said \par to have covered the incredible distance of 300 _li_ within \par twenty-four hours.]\par \par doing a hundred LI in order to wrest an advantage, the leaders of \par all your three divisions will fall into the hands of the enemy.\par 8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will \par fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your army will \par reach its destination.\par \par [The moral is, as Ts`ao Kung and others point out: Don't \par march a hundred LI to gain a tactical advantage, either with or \par without impedimenta. Maneuvers of this description should be \par confined to short distances. Stonewall Jackson said: "The \par hardships of forced marches are often more painful than the \par dangers of battle." He did not often call upon his troops for \par extraordinary exertions. It was only when he intended a \par surprise, or when a rapid retreat was imperative, that he \par sacrificed everything for speed. [1] ]\par \par 9. If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver the enemy, \par you will lose the leader of your first division, and only half \par your force will reach the goal.\par \par [Literally, "the leader of the first division will be \par TORN AWAY."]\par \par 10. If you march thirty LI with the same object, two-thirds \par of your army will arrive.\par \par [In the T`UNG TIEN is added: "From this we may know the \par difficulty of maneuvering."]\par \par 11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-\par train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of \par supply it is lost.\par \par [I think Sun Tzu meant "stores accumulated in depots." But \par Tu Yu says "fodder and the like," Chang Yu says "Goods in \par general," and Wang Hsi says "fuel, salt, foodstuffs, etc."]\par \par 12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted \par with the designs of our neighbors.\par 13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless we \par are familiar with the face of the country--its mountains and \par forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes and swamps.\par 14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to account \par unless we make use of local guides.\par \par [ss. 12-14 are repeated in chap. XI. ss. 52.]\par \par 15. In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed.\par \par [In the tactics of Turenne, deception of the enemy, \par especially as to the numerical strength of his troops, took a \par very prominent position. [2] ]\par \par 16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops, must \par be decided by circumstances.\par 17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind,\par \par [The simile is doubly appropriate, because the wind is not \par only swift but, as Mei Yao-ch`en points out, "invisible and \par leaves no tracks."]\par \par your compactness that of the forest.\par \par [Meng Shih comes nearer to the mark in his note: "When \par slowly marching, order and ranks must be preserved"--so as to \par guard against surprise attacks. But natural forest do not grow \par in rows, whereas they do generally possess the quality of density \par or compactness.]\par \par 18. In raiding and plundering be like fire,\par \par [Cf. SHIH CHING, IV. 3. iv. 6: "Fierce as a blazing fire \par which no man can check."]\par \par is immovability like a mountain.\par \par [That is, when holding a position from which the enemy is \par trying to dislodge you, or perhaps, as Tu Yu says, when he is \par trying to entice you into a trap.]\par \par 19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and \par when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.\par \par [Tu Yu quotes a saying of T`ai Kung which has passed into a \par proverb: "You cannot shut your ears to the thunder or your eyes \par to the lighting--so rapid are they." Likewise, an attack should \par be made so quickly that it cannot be parried.]\par \par 20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be \par divided amongst your men;\par \par [Sun Tzu wishes to lessen the abuses of indiscriminate \par plundering by insisting that all booty shall be thrown into a \par common stock, which may afterwards be fairly divided amongst \par all.]\par \par when you capture new territory, cut it up into allotments for the \par benefit of the soldiery.\par \par [Ch`en Hao says "quarter your soldiers on the land, and let \par them sow and plant it." It is by acting on this principle, and \par harvesting the lands they invaded, that the Chinese have \par succeeded in carrying out some of their most memorable and \par triumphant expeditions, such as that of Pan Ch`ao who penetrated \par to the Caspian, and in more recent years, those of Fu-k`ang-an \par and Tso Tsung-t`ang.]\par \par 21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.\par \par [Chang Yu quotes Wei Liao Tzu as saying that we must not \par break camp until we have gained the resisting power of the enemy \par and the cleverness of the opposing general. Cf. the "seven \par comparisons" in I. ss. 13.]\par \par 22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of \par deviation.\par \par [See supra, SS. 3, 4.]\par \par Such is the art of maneuvering.\par \par [With these words, the chapter would naturally come to an \par end. But there now follows a long appendix in the shape of an \par extract from an earlier book on War, now lost, but apparently \par extant at the time when Sun Tzu wrote. The style of this \par fragment is not noticeable different from that of Sun Tzu \par himself, but no commentator raises a doubt as to its \par genuineness.]\par \par 23. The Book of Army Management says:\par \par [It is perhaps significant that none of the earlier \par commentators give us any information about this work. Mei Yao-\par Ch`en calls it "an ancient military classic," and Wang Hsi, "an \par old book on war." Considering the enormous amount of fighting \par that had gone on for centuries before Sun Tzu's time between the \par various kingdoms and principalities of China, it is not in itself \par improbable that a collection of military maxims should have been \par made and written down at some earlier period.]\par \par On the field of battle,\par \par [Implied, though not actually in the Chinese.]\par \par the spoken word does not carry far enough: hence the institution \par of gongs and drums. Nor can ordinary objects be seen clearly \par enough: hence the institution of banners and flags.\par 24. Gongs and drums, banners and flags, are means whereby \par the ears and eyes of the host may be focused on one particular \par point.\par \par [Chang Yu says: "If sight and hearing converge \par simultaneously on the same object, the evolutions of as many as a \par million soldiers will be like those of a single man."!]\par \par 25. The host thus forming a single united body, is it \par impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for the \par cowardly to retreat alone.\par \par [Chuang Yu quotes a saying: "Equally guilty are those who \par advance against orders and those who retreat against orders." Tu \par Mu tells a story in this connection of Wu Ch`i, when he was \par fighting against the Ch`in State. Before the battle had begun, \par one of his soldiers, a man of matchless daring, sallied forth by \par himself, captured two heads from the enemy, and returned to camp. \par Wu Ch`i had the man instantly executed, whereupon an officer \par ventured to remonstrate, saying: "This man was a good soldier, \par and ought not to have been beheaded." Wu Ch`i replied: "I fully \par believe he was a good soldier, but I had him beheaded because he \par acted without orders."]\par \par This is the art of handling large masses of men.\par 26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal-fires \par and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and banners, as a \par means of influencing the ears and eyes of your army.\par \par [Ch`en Hao alludes to Li Kuang-pi's night ride to Ho-yang at \par the head of 500 mounted men; they made such an imposing display \par with torches, that though the rebel leader Shih Ssu-ming had a \par large army, he did not dare to dispute their passage.]\par \par 27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit;\par \par ["In war," says Chang Yu, "if a spirit of anger can be made \par to pervade all ranks of an army at one and the same time, its \par onset will be irresistible. Now the spirit of the enemy's \par soldiers will be keenest when they have newly arrived on the \par scene, and it is therefore our cue not to fight at once, but to \par wait until their ardor and enthusiasm have worn off, and then \par strike. It is in this way that they may be robbed of their keen \par spirit." Li Ch`uan and others tell an anecdote (to be found in \par the TSO CHUAN, year 10, ss. 1) of Ts`ao Kuei, a protege of Duke \par Chuang of Lu. The latter State was attacked by Ch`i, and the \par duke was about to join battle at Ch`ang-cho, after the first roll \par of the enemy's drums, when Ts`ao said: "Not just yet." Only \par after their drums had beaten for the third time, did he give the \par word for attack. Then they fought, and the men of Ch`i were \par utterly defeated. Questioned afterwards by the Duke as to the \par meaning of his delay, Ts`ao Kuei replied: "In battle, a \par courageous spirit is everything. Now the first roll of the drum \par tends to create this spirit, but with the second it is already on \par the wane, and after the third it is gone altogether. I attacked \par when their spirit was gone and ours was at its height. Hence our \par victory." Wu Tzu (chap. 4) puts "spirit" first among the "four \par important influences" in war, and continues: "The value of a \par whole army--a mighty host of a million men--is dependent on one \par man alone: such is the influence of spirit!"]\par \par a commander-in-chief may be robbed of his presence of mind.\par \par [Chang Yu says: "Presence of mind is the general's most \par important asset. It is the quality which enables him to \par discipline disorder and to inspire courage into the panic-\par stricken." The great general Li Ching (A.D. 571-649) has a \par saying: "Attacking does not merely consist in assaulting walled \par cities or striking at an army in battle array; it must include \par the art of assailing the enemy's mental equilibrium."]\par \par 28. Now a solider's spirit is keenest in the morning;\par \par [Always provided, I suppose, that he has had breakfast. At \par the battle of the Trebia, the Romans were foolishly allowed to \par fight fasting, whereas Hannibal's men had breakfasted at \par their leisure. See Livy, XXI, liv. 8, lv. 1 and 8.]\par \par by noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his mind is \par bent only on returning to camp.\par 29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when its \par spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and inclined \par to return. This is the art of studying moods.\par 30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of \par disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:--this is the art of \par retaining self-possession.\par 31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from \par it, to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling, to \par be well-fed while the enemy is famished:--this is the art of \par husbanding one's strength.\par 32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners are \par in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an army drawn up in \par calm and confident array:--this is the art of studying \par circumstances.\par 33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against \par the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.\par 34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do not \par attack soldiers whose temper is keen.\par 35. Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy.\par \par [Li Ch`uan and Tu Mu, with extraordinary inability to see a \par metaphor, take these words quite literally of food and drink that \par have been poisoned by the enemy. Ch`en Hao and Chang Yu \par carefully point out that the saying has a wider application.]\par \par Do not interfere with an army that is returning home.\par \par [The commentators explain this rather singular piece of \par advice by saying that a man whose heart is set on returning home \par will fight to the death against any attempt to bar his way, and \par is therefore too dangerous an opponent to be tackled. Chang Yu \par quotes the words of Han Hsin: "Invincible is the soldier who \par hath his desire and returneth homewards." A marvelous tale is \par told of Ts`ao Ts`ao's courage and resource in ch. 1 of the SAN \par KUO CHI: In 198 A.D., he was besieging Chang Hsiu in Jang, when \par Liu Piao sent reinforcements with a view to cutting off Ts`ao's \par retreat. The latter was obligbed to draw off his troops, only to \par find himself hemmed in between two enemies, who were guarding \par each outlet of a narrow pass in which he had engaged himself. In \par this desperate plight Ts`ao waited until nightfall, when he bored \par a tunnel into the mountain side and laid an ambush in it. As \par soon as the whole army had passed by, the hidden troops fell on \par his rear, while Ts`ao himself turned and met his pursuers in \par front, so that they were thrown into confusion and annihilated. \par Ts`ao Ts`ao said afterwards: "The brigands tried to check my \par army in its retreat and brought me to battle in a desperate \par position: hence I knew how to overcome them."]\par \par 36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free.\par \par [This does not mean that the enemy is to be allowed to \par escape. The object, as Tu Mu puts it, is "to make him believe \par that there is a road to safety, and thus prevent his fighting \par with the courage of despair." Tu Mu adds pleasantly: "After \par that, you may crush him."]\par \par Do not press a desperate foe too hard.\par \par [Ch`en Hao quotes the saying: "Birds and beasts when \par brought to bay will use their claws and teeth." Chang Yu says: \par "If your adversary has burned his boats and destroyed his \par cooking-pots, and is ready to stake all on the issue of a battle, \par he must not be pushed to extremities." Ho Shih illustrates the \par meaning by a story taken from the life of Yen-ch`ing. That \par general, together with his colleague Tu Chung-wei was surrounded \par by a vastly superior army of Khitans in the year 945 A.D. The \par country was bare and desert-like, and the little Chinese force \par was soon in dire straits for want of water. The wells they bored \par ran dry, and the men were reduced to squeezing lumps of mud and \par sucking out the moisture. Their ranks thinned rapidly, until at \par last Fu Yen-ch`ing exclaimed: "We are desperate men. Far better \par to die for our country than to go with fettered hands into \par captivity!" A strong gale happened to be blowing from the \par northeast and darkening the air with dense clouds of sandy dust. \par To Chung-wei was for waiting until this had abated before \par deciding on a final attack; but luckily another officer, Li Shou-\par cheng by name, was quicker to see an opportunity, and said: \par "They are many and we are few, but in the midst of this sandstorm \par our numbers will not be discernible; victory will go to the \par strenuous fighter, and the wind will be our best ally." \par Accordingly, Fu Yen-ch`ing made a sudden and wholly unexpected \par onslaught with his cavalry, routed the barbarians and succeeded \par in breaking through to safety.]\par \par 37. Such is the art of warfare.\par \par \par [1] See Col. Henderson, op. cit. vol. I. p. 426.\par \par [2] For a number of maxims on this head, see "Marshal Turenne" \par (Longmans, 1907), p. 29.\par \par -----------------------------------------------------------------\par \par VIII. VARIATION IN TACTICS\par \par \par [The heading means literally "The Nine Variations," but as \par Sun Tzu does not appear to enumerate these, and as, indeed, he \par has already told us (V SS. 6-11) that such deflections from the \par ordinary course are practically innumerable, we have little \par option but to follow Wang Hsi, who says that "Nine" stands for an \par indefinitely large number. "All it means is that in warfare we \par ought to very our tactics to the utmost degree.... I do not know \par what Ts`ao Kung makes these Nine Variations out to be, but it has \par been suggested that they are connected with the Nine Situations" \par - of chapt. XI. This is the view adopted by Chang Yu. The only \par other alternative is to suppose that something has been lost--a \par supposition to which the unusual shortness of the chapter lends \par some weight.]\par \par 1. Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his \par commands from the sovereign, collects his army and concentrates \par his forces.\par \par [Repeated from VII. ss. 1, where it is certainly more in \par place. It may have been interpolated here merely in order to \par supply a beginning to the chapter.]\par \par 2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country \par where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not \par linger in dangerously isolated positions.\par \par [The last situation is not one of the Nine Situations as \par given in the beginning of chap. XI, but occurs later on (ibid. \par ss. 43. q.v.). Chang Yu defines this situation as being situated \par across the frontier, in hostile territory. Li Ch`uan says it is \par "country in which there are no springs or wells, flocks or herds, \par vegetables or firewood;" Chia Lin, "one of gorges, chasms and \par precipices, without a road by which to advance."]\par \par In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In \par desperate position, you must fight.\par 3. There are roads which must not be followed,\par \par ["Especially those leading through narrow defiles," says Li \par Ch`uan, "where an ambush is to be feared."]\par \par armies which must be not attacked,\par \par [More correctly, perhaps, "there are times when an army must \par not be attacked." Ch`en Hao says: "When you see your way to \par obtain a rival advantage, but are powerless to inflict a real \par defeat, refrain from attacking, for fear of overtaxing your men's \par strength."]\par \par towns which must not be besieged,\par \par [Cf. III. ss. 4 Ts`ao Kung gives an interesting \par illustration from his own experience. When invading the \par territory of Hsu-chou, he ignored the city of Hua-pi, which lay \par directly in his path, and pressed on into the heart of the \par country. This excellent strategy was rewarded by the subsequent \par capture of no fewer than fourteen important district cities. \par Chang Yu says: "No town should be attacked which, if taken, \par cannot be held, or if left alone, will not cause any trouble." \par Hsun Ying, when urged to attack Pi-yang, replied: "The city is \par small and well-fortified; even if I succeed intaking it, it will \par be no great feat of arms; whereas if I fail, I shall make myself \par a laughing-stock." In the seventeenth century, sieges still \par formed a large proportion of war. It was Turenne who directed \par attention to the importance of marches, countermarches and \par maneuvers. He said: "It is a great mistake to waste men in \par taking a town when the same expenditure of soldiers will gain a \par province." [1] ]\par \par positions which must not be contested, commands of the sovereign \par which must not be obeyed.\par \par [This is a hard saying for the Chinese, with their reverence \par for authority, and Wei Liao Tzu (quoted by Tu Mu) is moved to \par exclaim: "Weapons are baleful instruments, strife is \par antagonistic to virtue, a military commander is the negation of \par civil order!" The unpalatable fact remains, however, that even \par Imperial wishes must be subordinated to military necessity.]\par \par 4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages \par that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his \par troops.\par 5. The general who does not understand these, may be well \par acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he will not \par be able to turn his knowledge to practical account.\par \par [Literally, "get the advantage of the ground," which means \par not only securing good positions, but availing oneself of natural \par advantages in every possible way. Chang Yu says: "Every kind of \par ground is characterized by certain natural features, and also \par gives scope for a certain variability of plan. How it is \par possible to turn these natural features to account unless \par topographical knowledge is supplemented by versatility of mind?"]\par \par 6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of war \par of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted with the Five \par Advantages, will fail to make the best use of his men.\par \par [Chia Lin tells us that these imply five obvious and \par generally advantageous lines of action, namely: "if a certain \par road is short, it must be followed; if an army is isolated, it \par must be attacked; if a town is in a parlous condition, it must be \par besieged; if a position can be stormed, it must be attempted; and \par if consistent with military operations, the ruler's commands must \par be obeyed." But there are circumstances which sometimes forbid a \par general to use these advantages. For instance, "a certain road \par may be the shortest way for him, but if he knows that it abounds \par in natural obstacles, or that the enemy has laid an ambush on it, \par he will not follow that road. A hostile force may be open to \par attack, but if he knows that it is hard-pressed and likely to \par fight with desperation, he will refrain from striking," and so \par on.]\par \par 7. Hence in the wise leader's plans, considerations of \par advantage and of disadvantage will be blended together.\par \par ["Whether in an advantageous position or a disadvantageous \par one," says Ts`ao Kung, "the opposite state should be always \par present to your mind."]\par \par 8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this way, \par we may succeed in accomplishing the essential part of our \par schemes.\par \par [Tu Mu says: "If we wish to wrest an advantage from the \par enemy, we must not fix our minds on that alone, but allow for the \par possibility of the enemy also doing some harm to us, and let this \par enter as a factor into our calculations."]\par \par 9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we \par are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate \par ourselves from misfortune.\par \par [Tu Mu says: "If I wish to extricate myself from a \par dangerous position, I must consider not only the enemy's ability \par to injure me, but also my own ability to gain an advantage over \par the enemy. If in my counsels these two considerations are \par properly blended, I shall succeed in liberating myself.... For \par instance; if I am surrounded by the enemy and only think of \par effecting an escape, the nervelessness of my policy will incite \par my adversary to pursue and crush me; it would be far better to \par encourage my men to deliver a bold counter-attack, and use the \par advantage thus gained to free myself from the enemy's toils." \par See the story of Ts`ao Ts`ao, VII. ss. 35, note.]\par \par 10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on them;\par \par [Chia Lin enumerates several ways of inflicting this injury, \par some of which would only occur to the Oriental mind:--"Entice \par away the enemy's best and wisest men, so that he may be left \par without counselors. Introduce traitors into his country, that \par the government policy may be rendered futile. Foment intrigue \par and deceit, and thus sow dissension between the ruler and his \par ministers. By means of every artful contrivance, cause \par deterioration amongst his men and waste of his treasure. Corrupt \par his morals by insidious gifts leading him into excess. Disturb \par and unsettle his mind by presenting him with lovely women." \par Chang Yu (after Wang Hsi) makes a different interpretation of Sun \par Tzu here: "Get the enemy into a position where he must suffer \par injury, and he will submit of his own accord."]\par \par and make trouble for them,\par \par [Tu Mu, in this phrase, in his interpretation indicates that \par trouble should be make for the enemy affecting their \par "possessions," or, as we might say, "assets," which he considers \par to be "a large army, a rich exchequer, harmony amongst the \par soldiers, punctual fulfillment of commands." These give us a \par whip-hand over the enemy.]\par \par and keep them constantly engaged;\par \par [Literally, "make servants of them." Tu Yu says "prevent \par the from having any rest."]\par \par hold out specious allurements, and make them rush to any given \par point.\par \par [Meng Shih's note contains an excellent example of the \par idiomatic use of: "cause them to forget PIEN (the reasons for \par acting otherwise than on their first impulse), and hasten in our \par direction."]\par \par 11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood \par of the enemy's not coming, but on our own readiness to receive \par him; not on the chance of his not attacking, but rather on the \par fact that we have made our position unassailable.\par 12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a \par general: (1) Recklessness, which leads to destruction;\par \par ["Bravery without forethought," as Ts`ao Kung analyzes it, \par which causes a man to fight blindly and desperately like a mad \par bull. Such an opponent, says Chang Yu, "must not be encountered \par with brute force, but may be lured into an ambush and slain." \par Cf. Wu Tzu, chap. IV. ad init.: "In estimating the character of \par a general, men are wont to pay exclusive attention to his \par courage, forgetting that courage is only one out of many \par qualities which a general should possess. The merely brave man \par is prone to fight recklessly; and he who fights recklessly, \par without any perception of what is expedient, must be condemned." \par Ssu-ma Fa, too, make the incisive remark: "Simply going to one's \par death does not bring about victory."]\par \par (2) cowardice, which leads to capture;\par \par [Ts`ao Kung defines the Chinese word translated here as \par "cowardice" as being of the man "whom timidity prevents from \par advancing to seize an advantage," and Wang Hsi adds "who is quick \par to flee at the sight of danger." Meng Shih gives the closer \par paraphrase "he who is bent on returning alive," this is, the man \par who will never take a risk. But, as Sun Tzu knew, nothing is to \par be achieved in war unless you are willing to take risks. T`ai \par Kung said: "He who lets an advantage slip will subsequently \par bring upon himself real disaster." In 404 A.D., Liu Yu pursued \par the rebel Huan Hsuan up the Yangtsze and fought a naval battle \par with him at the island of Ch`eng-hung. The loyal troops numbered \par only a few thousands, while their opponents were in great force. \par But Huan Hsuan, fearing the fate which was in store for him \par should be be overcome, had a light boat made fast to the side of \par his war-junk, so that he might escape, if necessary, at a \par moment's notice. The natural result was that the fighting spirit \par of his soldiers was utterly quenched, and when the loyalists made \par an attack from windward with fireships, all striving with the \par utmost ardor to be first in the fray, Huan Hsuan's forces were \par routed, had to burn all their baggage and fled for two days and \par nights without stopping. Chang Yu tells a somewhat similar story \par of Chao Ying-ch`i, a general of the Chin State who during a \par battle with the army of Ch`u in 597 B.C. had a boat kept in \par readiness for him on the river, wishing in case of defeat to be \par the first to get across.]\par \par (3) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by insults;\par \par [Tu Mu tells us that Yao Hsing, when opposed in 357 A.D. by \par Huang Mei, Teng Ch`iang and others shut himself up behind his \par walls and refused to fight. Teng Ch`iang said: "Our adversary \par is of a choleric temper and easily provoked; let us make constant \par sallies and break down his walls, then he will grow angry and \par come out. Once we can bring his force to battle, it is doomed to \par be our prey." This plan was acted upon, Yao Hsiang came out to \par fight, was lured as far as San-yuan by the enemy's pretended \par flight, and finally attacked and slain.]\par \par (4) a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame;\par \par [This need not be taken to mean that a sense of honor is \par really a defect in a general. What Sun Tzu condemns is rather an \par exaggerated sensitiveness to slanderous reports, the thin-skinned \par man who is stung by opprobrium, however undeserved. Mei Yao-\par ch`en truly observes, though somewhat paradoxically: "The seek \par after glory should be careless of public opinion."]\par \par (5) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him to worry \par and trouble.\par \par [Here again, Sun Tzu does not mean that the general is to be \par careless of the welfare of his troops. All he wishes to \par emphasize is the danger of sacrificing any important military \par advantage to the immediate comfort of his men. This is a \par shortsighted policy, because in the long run the troops will \par suffer more from the defeat, or, at best, the prolongation of the \par war, which will be the consequence. A mistaken feeling of pity \par will often induce a general to relieve a beleaguered city, or to \par reinforce a hard-pressed detachment, contrary to his military \par instincts. It is now generally admitted that our repeated \par efforts to relieve Ladysmith in the South African War were so \par many strategical blunders which defeated their own purpose. And \par in the end, relief came through the very man who started out with \par the distinct resolve no longer to subordinate the interests of \par the whole to sentiment in favor of a part. An old soldier of one \par of our generals who failed most conspicuously in this war, tried \par once, I remember, to defend him to me on the ground that he was \par always "so good to his men." By this plea, had he but known it, \par he was only condemning him out of Sun Tzu's mouth.]\par \par 13. These are the five besetting sins of a general, ruinous \par to the conduct of war.\par 14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain, the \par cause will surely be found among these five dangerous faults. \par Let them be a subject of meditation.\par \par \par [1] "Marshal Turenne," p. 50.\par \par -----------------------------------------------------------------\par \par IX. THE ARMY ON THE MARCH\par \par \par [The contents of this interesting chapter are better \par indicated in ss. 1 than by this heading.]\par \par 1. Sun Tzu said: We come now to the question of encamping \par the army, and observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over \par mountains, and keep in the neighborhood of valleys.\par \par [The idea is, not to linger among barren uplands, but to \par keep close to supplies of water and grass. Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. 3: \par "Abide not in natural ovens," i.e. "the openings of valleys." \par Chang Yu tells the following anecdote: Wu-tu Ch`iang was a \par robber captain in the time of the Later Han, and Ma Yuan was sent \par to exterminate his gang. Ch`iang having found a refuge in the \par hills, Ma Yuan made no attempt to force a battle, but seized all \par the favorable positions commanding supplies of water and forage. \par Ch`iang was soon in such a desperate plight for want of \par provisions that he was forced to make a total surrender. He did \par not know the advantage of keeping in the neighborhood of \par valleys."]\par \par 2. Camp in high places,\par \par [Not on high hills, but on knolls or hillocks elevated above \par the surrounding country.]\par \par facing the sun.\par \par [Tu Mu takes this to mean "facing south," and Ch`en Hao \par "facing east." Cf. infra, SS. 11, 13.\par \par Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain \par warfare.\par 3. After crossing a river, you should get far away from it.\par \par ["In order to tempt the enemy to cross after you," according \par to Ts`ao Kung, and also, says Chang Yu, "in order not to be \par impeded in your evolutions." The T`UNG TIEN reads, "If THE ENEMY \par crosses a river," etc. But in view of the next sentence, this is \par almost certainly an interpolation.]\par \par 4. When an invading force crosses a river in its onward \par march, do not advance to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best \par to let half the army get across, and then deliver your attack.\par \par [Li Ch`uan alludes to the great victory won by Han Hsin over \par Lung Chu at the Wei River. Turning to the CH`IEN HAN SHU, ch. \par 34, fol. 6 verso, we find the battle described as follows: "The \par two armies were drawn up on opposite sides of the river. In the \par night, Han Hsin ordered his men to take some ten thousand sacks \par filled with sand and construct a dam higher up. Then, leading \par half his army across, he attacked Lung Chu; but after a time, \par pretending to have failed in his attempt, he hastily withdrew to \par the other bank. Lung Chu was much elated by this unlooked-for \par success, and exclaiming: "I felt sure that Han Hsin was really a \par coward!" he pursued him and began crossing the river in his turn. \par Han Hsin now sent a party to cut open the sandbags, thus \par releasing a great volume of water, which swept down and prevented \par the greater portion of Lung Chu's army from getting across. He \par then turned upon the force which had been cut off, and \par annihilated it, Lung Chu himself being amongst the slain. The \par rest of the army, on the further bank, also scattered and fled in \par all directions.]\par \par 5. If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet \par the invader near a river which he has to cross.\par \par [For fear of preventing his crossing.]\par \par 6. Moor your craft higher up than the enemy, and facing the \par sun.\par \par [See supra, ss. 2. The repetition of these words in \par connection with water is very awkward. Chang Yu has the note: \par "Said either of troops marshaled on the river-bank, or of boats \par anchored in the stream itself; in either case it is essential to \par be higher than the enemy and facing the sun." The other \par commentators are not at all explicit.]\par \par Do not move up-stream to meet the enemy.\par \par [Tu Mu says: "As water flows downwards, we must not pitch \par our camp on the lower reaches of a river, for fear the enemy \par should open the sluices and sweep us away in a flood. Chu-ko Wu-\par hou has remarked that 'in river warfare we must not advance \par against the stream,' which is as much as to say that our fleet \par must not be anchored below that of the enemy, for then they would \par be able to take advantage of the current and make short work of \par us." There is also the danger, noted by other commentators, that \par the enemy may throw poison on the water to be carried down to \par us.]\par \par So much for river warfare.\par 7. In crossing salt-marshes, your sole concern should be to \par get over them quickly, without any delay.\par \par [Because of the lack of fresh water, the poor quality of the \par herbage, and last but not least, because they are low, flat, and \par exposed to attack.]\par \par 8. If forced to fight in a salt-marsh, you should have \par water and grass near you, and get your back to a clump of trees.\par \par [Li Ch`uan remarks that the ground is less likely to be \par treacherous where there are trees, while Tu Mu says that they \par will serve to protect the rear.]\par \par So much for operations in salt-marches.\par 9. In dry, level country, take up an easily accessible \par position with rising ground to your right and on your rear,\par \par [Tu Mu quotes T`ai Kung as saying: "An army should have a \par stream or a marsh on its left, and a hill or tumulus on its \par right."]\par \par so that the danger may be in front, and safety lie behind. So \par much for campaigning in flat country.\par 10. These are the four useful branches of military \par knowledge\par \par [Those, namely, concerned with (1) mountains, (2) rivers, \par (3) marshes, and (4) plains. Compare Napoleon's "Military \par Maxims," no. 1.]\par \par which enabled the Yellow Emperor to vanquish four several \par sovereigns.\par \par [Regarding the "Yellow Emperor": Mei Yao-ch`en asks, with \par some plausibility, whether there is an error in the text as \par nothing is known of Huang Ti having conquered four other \par Emperors. The SHIH CHI (ch. 1 ad init.) speaks only of his \par victories over Yen Ti and Ch`ih Yu. In the LIU T`AO it is \par mentioned that he "fought seventy battles and pacified the \par Empire." Ts`ao Kung's explanation is, that the Yellow Emperor \par was the first to institute the feudal system of vassals princes, \par each of whom (to the number of four) originally bore the title of \par Emperor. Li Ch`uan tells us that the art of war originated under \par Huang Ti, who received it from his Minister Feng Hou.]\par \par 11. All armies prefer high ground to low.\par \par ["High Ground," says Mei Yao-ch`en, "is not only more \par agreement and salubrious, but more convenient from a military \par point of view; low ground is not only damp and unhealthy, but \par also disadvantageous for fighting."]\par \par and sunny places to dark.\par 12. If you are careful of your men,\par \par [Ts`ao Kung says: "Make for fresh water and pasture, where \par you can turn out your animals to graze."]\par \par and camp on hard ground, the army will be free from disease of \par every kind,\par \par [Chang Yu says: "The dryness of the climate will prevent \par the outbreak of illness."]\par \par and this will spell victory.\par 13. When you come to a hill or a bank, occupy the sunny \par side, with the slope on your right rear. Thus you will at once \par act for the benefit of your soldiers and utilize the natural \par advantages of the ground.\par 14. When, in consequence of heavy rains up-country, a river \par which you wish to ford is swollen and flecked with foam, you must \par wait until it subsides.\par 15. Country in which there are precipitous cliffs with \par torrents running between, deep natural hollows,\par \par [The latter defined as "places enclosed on every side by \par steep banks, with pools of water at the bottom.]\par \par confined places,\par \par [Defined as "natural pens or prisons" or "places surrounded \par by precipices on three sides--easy to get into, but hard to get \par out of."]\par \par tangled thickets,\par \par [Defined as "places covered with such dense undergrowth that \par spears cannot be used."]\par \par quagmires\par \par [Defined as "low-lying places, so heavy with mud as to be \par impassable for chariots and horsemen."]\par \par and crevasses,\par \par [Defined by Mei Yao-ch`en as "a narrow difficult way between \par beetling cliffs." Tu Mu's note is "ground covered with trees and \par rocks, and intersected by numerous ravines and pitfalls." This \par is very vague, but Chia Lin explains it clearly enough as a \par defile or narrow pass, and Chang Yu takes much the same view. On \par the whole, the weight of the commentators certainly inclines to \par the rendering "defile." But the ordinary meaning of the Chinese \par in one place is "a crack or fissure" and the fact that the \par meaning of the Chinese elsewhere in the sentence indicates \par something in the nature of a defile, make me think that Sun Tzu \par is here speaking of crevasses.]\par \par should be left with all possible speed and not approached.\par 16. While we keep away from such places, we should get the \par enemy to approach them; while we face them, we should let the \par enemy have them on his rear.\par 17. If in the neighborhood of your camp there should be any \par hilly country, ponds surrounded by aquatic grass, hollow basins \par filled with reeds, or woods with thick undergrowth, they must be \par carefully routed out and searched; for these are places where men \par in ambush or insidious spies are likely to be lurking.\par \par [Chang Yu has the note: "We must also be on our guard \par against traitors who may lie in close covert, secretly spying out \par our weaknesses and overhearing our instructions."]\par \par 18. When the enemy is close at hand and remains quiet, he \par is relying on the natural strength of his position.\par \par [Here begin Sun Tzu's remarks on the reading of signs, much \par of which is so good that it could almost be included in a modern \par manual like Gen. Baden-Powell's "Aids to Scouting."]\par \par 19. When he keeps aloof and tries to provoke a battle, he \par is anxious for the other side to advance.\par \par [Probably because we are in a strong position from which he \par wishes to dislodge us. "If he came close up to us, says Tu Mu, \par "and tried to force a battle, he would seem to despise us, and \par there would be less probability of our responding to the \par challenge."]\par \par 20. If his place of encampment is easy of access, he is \par tendering a bait.\par 21. Movement amongst the trees of a forest shows that the \par enemy is advancing.\par \par [Ts`ao Kung explains this as "felling trees to clear a \par passage," and Chang Yu says: "Every man sends out scouts to \par climb high places and observe the enemy. If a scout sees that \par the trees of a forest are moving and shaking, he may know that \par they are being cut down to clear a passage for the enemy's \par march."]\par \par The appearance of a number of screens in the midst of thick grass \par means that the enemy wants to make us suspicious.\par \par [Tu Yu's explanation, borrowed from Ts`ao Kung's, is as \par follows: "The presence of a number of screens or sheds in the \par midst of thick vegetation is a sure sign that the enemy has fled \par and, fearing pursuit, has constructed these hiding-places in \par order to make us suspect an ambush." It appears that these \par "screens" were hastily knotted together out of any long grass \par which the retreating enemy happened to come across.]\par \par 22. The rising of birds in their flight is the sign of an \par ambuscade.\par \par [Chang Yu's explanation is doubtless right: "When birds \par that are flying along in a straight line suddenly shoot upwards, \par it means that soldiers are in ambush at the spot beneath."]\par \par Startled beasts indicate that a sudden attack is coming.\par 23. When there is dust rising in a high column, it is the \par sign of chariots advancing; when the dust is low, but spread over \par a wide area, it betokens the approach of infantry.\par \par ["High and sharp," or rising to a peak, is of course \par somewhat exaggerated as applied to dust. The commentators \par explain the phenomenon by saying that horses and chariots, being \par heavier than men, raise more dust, and also follow one another in \par the same wheel-track, whereas foot-soldiers would be marching in \par ranks, many abreast. According to Chang Yu, "every army on the \par march must have scouts some way in advance, who on sighting dust \par raised by the enemy, will gallop back and report it to the \par commander-in-chief." Cf. Gen. Baden-Powell: "As you move along, \par say, in a hostile country, your eyes should be looking afar for \par the enemy or any signs of him: figures, dust rising, birds \par getting up, glitter of arms, etc." [1] ]\par \par When it branches out in different directions, it shows that \par parties have been sent to collect firewood. A few clouds of dust \par moving to and fro signify that the army is encamping.\par \par [Chang Yu says: "In apportioning the defenses for a \par cantonment, light horse will be sent out to survey the position \par and ascertain the weak and strong points all along its \par circumference. Hence the small quantity of dust and its \par motion."]\par \par 24. Humble words and increased preparations are signs that \par the enemy is about to advance.\par \par ["As though they stood in great fear of us," says Tu Mu. \par "Their object is to make us contemptuous and careless, after \par which they will attack us." Chang Yu alludes to the story of \par T`ien Tan of the Ch`i-mo against the Yen forces, led by Ch`i \par Chieh. In ch. 82 of the SHIH CHI we read: "T`ien Tan openly \par said: 'My only fear is that the Yen army may cut off the noses \par of their Ch`i prisoners and place them in the front rank to fight \par against us; that would be the undoing of our city.' The other \par side being informed of this speech, at once acted on the \par suggestion; but those within the city were enraged at seeing \par their fellow-countrymen thus mutilated, and fearing only lest \par they should fall into the enemy's hands, were nerved to defend \par themselves more obstinately than ever. Once again T`ien Tan sent \par back converted spies who reported these words to the enemy: \par "What I dread most is that the men of Yen may dig up the \par ancestral tombs outside the town, and by inflicting this \par indignity on our forefathers cause us to become faint-hearted.' \par Forthwith the besiegers dug up all the graves and burned the \par corpses lying in them. And the inhabitants of Chi-mo, witnessing \par the outrage from the city-walls, wept passionately and were all \par impatient to go out and fight, their fury being increased \par tenfold. T`ien Tan knew then that his soldiers were ready for \par any enterprise. But instead of a sword, he himself too a \par mattock in his hands, and ordered others to be distributed \par amongst his best warriors, while the ranks were filled up with \par their wives and concubines. He then served out all the remaining \par rations and bade his men eat their fill. The regular soldiers \par were told to keep out of sight, and the walls were manned with \par the old and weaker men and with women. This done, envoys were \par dispatched to the enemy's camp to arrange terms of surrender, \par whereupon the Yen army began shouting for joy. T`ien Tan also \par collected 20,000 ounces of silver from the people, and got the \par wealthy citizens of Chi-mo to send it to the Yen general with the \par prayer that, when the town capitulated, he would allow their \par homes to be plundered or their women to be maltreated. Ch`i \par Chieh, in high good humor, granted their prayer; but his army now \par became increasingly slack and careless. Meanwhile, T`ien Tan got \par together a thousand oxen, decked them with pieces of red silk, \par painted their bodies, dragon-like, with colored stripes, and \par fastened sharp blades on their horns and well-greased rushes on \par their tails. When night came on, he lighted the ends of the \par rushes, and drove the oxen through a number of holes which he had \par pierced in the walls, backing them up with a force of 5000 picked \par warriors. The animals, maddened with pain, dashed furiously \par into the enemy's camp where they caused the utmost confusion and \par dismay; for their tails acted as torches, showing up the hideous \par pattern on their bodies, and the weapons on their horns killed or \par wounded any with whom they came into contact. In the meantime, \par the band of 5000 had crept up with gags in their mouths, and now \par threw themselves on the enemy. At the same moment a frightful \par din arose in the city itself, all those that remained behind \par making as much noise as possible by banging drums and hammering \par on bronze vessels, until heaven and earth were convulsed by the \par uproar. Terror-stricken, the Yen army fled in disorder, hotly \par pursued by the men of Ch`i, who succeeded in slaying their \par general Ch`i Chien.... The result of the battle was the ultimate \par recovery of some seventy cities which had belonged to the Ch`i \par State."]\par \par Violent language and driving forward as if to the attack are \par signs that he will retreat.\par 25. When the light chariots come out first and take up a \par position on the wings, it is a sign that the enemy is forming for \par battle.\par 26. Peace proposals unaccompanied by a sworn covenant \par indicate a plot.\par \par [The reading here is uncertain. Li Ch`uan indicates "a \par treaty confirmed by oaths and hostages." Wang Hsi and Chang Yu, \par on the other hand, simply say "without reason," "on a frivolous \par pretext."]\par \par 27. When there is much running about\par \par [Every man hastening to his proper place under his own \par regimental banner.]\par \par and the soldiers fall into rank, it means that the critical \par moment has come.\par 28. When some are seen advancing and some retreating, it is \par a lure.\par 29. When the soldiers stand leaning on their spears, they \par are faint from want of food.\par 30. If those who are sent to draw water begin by drinking \par themselves, the army is suffering from thirst.\par \par [As Tu Mu remarks: "One may know the condition of a whole \par army from the behavior of a single man."]\par \par 31. If the enemy sees an advantage to be gained and makes \par no effort to secure it, the soldiers are exhausted.\par 32. If birds gather on any spot, it is unoccupied.\par \par [A useful fact to bear in mind when, for instance, as Ch`en \par Hao says, the enemy has secretly abandoned his camp.]\par \par Clamor by night betokens nervousness.\par \par 33. If there is disturbance in the camp, the general's \par authority is weak. If the banners and flags are shifted about, \par sedition is afoot. If the officers are angry, it means that the \par men are weary.\par \par [Tu Mu understands the sentence differently: "If all the \par officers of an army are angry with their general, it means that \par they are broken with fatigue" owing to the exertions which he has \par demanded from them.]\par \par 34. When an army feeds its horses with grain and kills its \par cattle for food,\par \par [In the ordinary course of things, the men would be fed on \par grain and the horses chiefly on grass.]\par \par and when the men do not hang their cooking-pots over the camp-\par fires, showing that they will not return to their tents, you may \par know that they are determined to fight to the death.\par \par [I may quote here the illustrative passage from the HOU HAN \par SHU, ch. 71, given in abbreviated form by the P`EI WEN YUN FU: \par "The rebel Wang Kuo of Liang was besieging the town of Ch`en-\par ts`ang, and Huang-fu Sung, who was in supreme command, and Tung \par Cho were sent out against him. The latter pressed for hasty \par measures, but Sung turned a deaf ear to his counsel. At last the \par rebels were utterly worn out, and began to throw down their \par weapons of their own accord. Sung was not advancing to the \par attack, but Cho said: 'It is a principle of war not to pursue \par desperate men and not to press a retreating host.' Sung \par answered: 'That does not apply here. What I am about to attack \par is a jaded army, not a retreating host; with disciplined troops I \par am falling on a disorganized multitude, not a band of desperate \par men.' Thereupon he advances to the attack unsupported by his \par colleague, and routed the enemy, Wang Kuo being slain."]\par \par 35. The sight of men whispering together in small knots or \par speaking in subdued tones points to disaffection amongst the rank \par and file.\par 36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the \par end of his resources;\par \par [Because, when an army is hard pressed, as Tu Mu says, there \par is always a fear of mutiny, and lavish rewards are given to keep \par the men in good temper.]\par \par too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress.\par \par [Because in such case discipline becomes relaxed, and \par unwonted severity is necessary to keep the men to their duty.]\par \par 37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at \par the enemy's numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence.\par \par [I follow the interpretation of Ts`ao Kung, also adopted by \par Li Ch`uan, Tu Mu, and Chang Yu. Another possible meaning set \par forth by Tu Yu, Chia Lin, Mei Tao-ch`en and Wang Hsi, is: "The \par general who is first tyrannical towards his men, and then in \par terror lest they should mutiny, etc." This would connect the \par sentence with what went before about rewards and punishments.]\par \par 38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, \par it is a sign that the enemy wishes for a truce.\par \par [Tu Mu says: "If the enemy open friendly relations be \par sending hostages, it is a sign that they are anxious for an \par armistice, either because their strength is exhausted or for some \par other reason." But it hardly needs a Sun Tzu to draw such an \par obvious inference.]\par \par 39. If the enemy's troops march up angrily and remain \par facing ours for a long time without either joining battle or \par taking themselves off again, the situation is one that demands \par great vigilance and circumspection.\par \par [Ts`ao Kung says a maneuver of this sort may be only a ruse \par to gain time for an unexpected flank attack or the laying of an \par ambush.]\par \par 40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, \par that is amply sufficient; it only means that no direct attack can \par be made.\par \par [Literally, "no martial advance." That is to say, CHENG \par tactics and frontal attacks must be eschewed, and stratagem \par resorted to instead.]\par \par What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available \par strength, keep a close watch on the enemy, and obtain \par reinforcements.\par \par [This is an obscure sentence, and none of the commentators \par succeed in squeezing very good sense out of it. I follow Li \par Ch`uan, who appears to offer the simplest explanation: "Only the \par side that gets more men will win." Fortunately we have Chang Yu \par to expound its meaning to us in language which is lucidity \par itself: "When the numbers are even, and no favorable opening \par presents itself, although we may not be strong enough to deliver \par a sustained attack, we can find additional recruits amongst our \par sutlers and camp-followers, and then, concentrating our forces \par and keeping a close watch on the enemy, contrive to snatch the \par victory. But we must avoid borrowing foreign soldiers to help \par us." He then quotes from Wei Liao Tzu, ch. 3: "The nominal \par strength of mercenary troops may be 100,000, but their real value \par will be not more than half that figure."]\par \par 41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his \par opponents is sure to be captured by them.\par \par [Ch`en Hao, quoting from the TSO CHUAN, says: "If bees and \par scorpions carry poison, how much more will a hostile state! Even \par a puny opponent, then, should not be treated with contempt."]\par \par 42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown \par attached to you, they will not prove submissive; and, unless \par submissive, then will be practically useless. If, when the \par soldiers have become attached to you, punishments are not \par enforced, they will still be unless.\par 43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first \par instance with humanity, but kept under control by means of iron \par discipline.\par \par [Yen Tzu [B.C. 493] said of Ssu-ma Jang-chu: "His civil \par virtues endeared him to the people; his martial prowess kept his \par enemies in awe." Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. 4 init.: "The ideal commander \par unites culture with a warlike temper; the profession of arms \par requires a combination of hardness and tenderness."]\par \par This is a certain road to victory.\par \par 44. If in training soldiers commands are habitually \par enforced, the army will be well-disciplined; if not, its \par discipline will be bad.\par 45. If a general shows confidence in his men but always \par insists on his orders being obeyed,\par \par [Tu Mu says: "A general ought in time of peace to show \par kindly confidence in his men and also make his authority \par respected, so that when they come to face the enemy, orders may \par be executed and discipline maintained, because they all trust and \par look up to him." What Sun Tzu has said in ss. 44, however, would \par lead one rather to expect something like this: "If a general is \par always confident that his orders will be carried out," etc."]\par \par the gain will be mutual.\par \par [Chang Yu says: "The general has confidence in the men \par under his command, and the men are docile, having confidence in \par him. Thus the gain is mutual" He quotes a pregnant sentence \par from Wei Liao Tzu, ch. 4: "The art of giving orders is not to \par try to rectify minor blunders and not to be swayed by petty \par doubts." Vacillation and fussiness are the surest means of \par sapping the confidence of an army.]\par \par \par [1] "Aids to Scouting," p. 26.\par \par -----------------------------------------------------------------\par \par X. TERRAIN\par \par \par [Only about a third of the chapter, comprising ss. ss. 1-13, \par deals with "terrain," the subject being more fully treated in ch. \par XI. The "six calamities" are discussed in SS. 14-20, and the \par rest of the chapter is again a mere string of desultory remarks, \par though not less interesting, perhaps, on that account.]\par \par 1. Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, \par to wit: (1) Accessible ground;\par \par [Mei Yao-ch`en says: "plentifully provided with roads and \par means of communications."]\par \par (2) entangling ground;\par \par [The same commentator says: "Net-like country, venturing \par into which you become entangled."]\par \par (3) temporizing ground;\par \par [Ground which allows you to "stave off" or "delay."]\par \par (4) narrow passes; (5) precipitous heights; (6) positions at a \par great distance from the enemy.\par \par [It is hardly necessary to point out the faultiness of this \par classification. A strange lack of logical perception is shown in \par the Chinaman's unquestioning acceptance of glaring cross-\par divisions such as the above.]\par \par 2. Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is \par called ACCESSIBLE.\par 3. With regard to ground of this nature, be before the \par enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots, and carefully \par guard your line of supplies.\par \par [The general meaning of the last phrase is doubtlessly, as \par Tu Yu says, "not to allow the enemy to cut your communications." \par In view of Napoleon's dictum, "the secret of war lies in the \par communications," [1] we could wish that Sun Tzu had done more \par than skirt the edge of this important subject here and in I. ss. \par 10, VII. ss. 11. Col. Henderson says: "The line of supply may \par be said to be as vital to the existence of an army as the heart \par to the life of a human being. Just as the duelist who finds his \par adversary's point menacing him with certain death, and his own \par guard astray, is compelled to conform to his adversary's \par movements, and to content himself with warding off his thrusts, \par so the commander whose communications are suddenly threatened \par finds himself in a false position, and he will be fortunate if he \par has not to change all his plans, to split up his force into more \par or less isolated detachments, and to fight with inferior numbers \par on ground which he has not had time to prepare, and where defeat \par will not be an ordinary failure, but will entail the ruin or \par surrender of his whole army." [2]\par \par Then you will be able to fight with advantage.\par 4. Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy \par is called ENTANGLING.\par 5. From a position of this sort, if the enemy is \par unprepared, you may sally forth and defeat him. But if the enemy \par is prepared for your coming, and you fail to defeat him, then, \par return being impossible, disaster will ensue.\par 6. When the position is such that neither side will gain by \par making the first move, it is called TEMPORIZING ground.\par \par [Tu Mu says: "Each side finds it inconvenient to move, and \par the situation remains at a deadlock."]\par \par 7. In a position of this sort, even though the enemy should \par offer us an attractive bait,\par \par [Tu Yu says, "turning their backs on us and pretending to \par flee." But this is only one of the lures which might induce us \par to quit our position.]\par \par it will be advisable not to stir forth, but rather to retreat, \par thus enticing the enemy in his turn; then, when part of his army \par has come out, we may deliver our attack with advantage.\par 8. With regard to NARROW PASSES, if you can occupy them \par first, let them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of \par the enemy.\par \par [Because then, as Tu Yu observes, "the initiative will lie \par with us, and by making sudden and unexpected attacks we shall \par have the enemy at our mercy."]\par \par 9. Should the army forestall you in occupying a pass, do \par not go after him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it \par is weakly garrisoned.\par 10. With regard to PRECIPITOUS HEIGHTS, if you are \par beforehand with your adversary, you should occupy the raised and \par sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up.\par \par [Ts`ao Kung says: "The particular advantage of securing \par heights and defiles is that your actions cannot then be dictated \par by the enemy." [For the enunciation of the grand principle \par alluded to, see VI. ss. 2]. Chang Yu tells the following \par anecdote of P`ei Hsing-chien (A.D. 619-682), who was sent on a \par punitive expedition against the Turkic tribes. "At night he \par pitched his camp as usual, and it had already been completely \par fortified by wall and ditch, when suddenly he gave orders that \par the army should shift its quarters to a hill near by. This was \par highly displeasing to his officers, who protested loudly against \par the extra fatigue which it would entail on the men. P`ei Hsing-\par chien, however, paid no heed to their remonstrances and had the \par camp moved as quickly as possible. The same night, a terrific \par storm came on, which flooded their former place of encampment to \par the depth of over twelve feet. The recalcitrant officers were \par amazed at the sight, and owned that they had been in the wrong. \par 'How did you know what was going to happen?' they asked. P`ei \par Hsing-chien replied: 'From this time forward be content to obey \par orders without asking unnecessary questions.' From this it may \par be seen," Chang Yu continues, "that high and sunny places are \par advantageous not only for fighting, but also because they are \par immune from disastrous floods."]\par \par 11. If the enemy has occupied them before you, do not \par follow him, but retreat and try to entice him away.\par \par [The turning point of Li Shih-min's campaign in 621 A.D. \par against the two rebels, Tou Chien-te, King of Hsia, and Wang \par Shih-ch`ung, Prince of Cheng, was his seizure of the heights of \par Wu-lao, in spike of which Tou Chien-te persisted in his attempt \par to relieve his ally in Lo-yang, was defeated and taken prisoner. \par See CHIU T`ANG, ch. 2, fol. 5 verso, and also ch. 54.]\par \par 12. If you are situated at a great distance from the enemy, \par and the strength of the two armies is equal, it is not easy to \par provoke a battle,\par \par [The point is that we must not think of undertaking a long \par and wearisome march, at the end of which, as Tu Yu says, "we \par should be exhausted and our adversary fresh and keen."]\par \par and fighting will be to your disadvantage.\par \par 13. These six are the principles connected with Earth.\par \par [Or perhaps, "the principles relating to ground." See, \par however, I. ss. 8.]\par \par The general who has attained a responsible post must be careful \par to study them.\par 14. Now an army is exposed to six several calamities, not \par arising from natural causes, but from faults for which the \par general is responsible. These are: (1) Flight; (2) \par insubordination; (3) collapse; (4) ruin; (5) disorganization; (6) \par rout.\par 15. Other conditions being equal, if one force is hurled \par against another ten times its size, the result will be the FLIGHT \par of the former.\par 16. When the common soldiers are too strong and their \par officers too weak, the result is INSUBORDINATION.\par \par [Tu Mu cites the unhappy case of T`ien Pu [HSIN T`ANG SHU, \par ch. 148], who was sent to Wei in 821 A.D. with orders to lead an \par army against Wang T`ing-ts`ou. But the whole time he was in \par command, his soldiers treated him with the utmost contempt, and \par openly flouted his authority by riding about the camp on donkeys, \par several thousands at a time. T`ien Pu was powerless to put a \par stop to this conduct, and when, after some months had passed, he \par made an attempt to engage the enemy, his troops turned tail and \par dispersed in every direction. After that, the unfortunate man \par committed suicide by cutting his throat.]\par \par When the officers are too strong and the common soldiers too \par weak, the result is COLLAPSE.\par \par [Ts`ao Kung says: "The officers are energetic and want to \par press on, the common soldiers are feeble and suddenly collapse."]\par \par 17. When the higher officers are angry and insubordinate, \par and on meeting the enemy give battle on their own account from a \par feeling of resentment, before the commander-in-chief can tell \par whether or no he is in a position to fight, the result is RUIN.\par \par [Wang Hsi`s note is: "This means, the general is angry \par without cause, and at the same time does not appreciate the \par ability of his subordinate officers; thus he arouses fierce \par resentment and brings an avalanche of ruin upon his head."]\par \par 18. When the general is weak and without authority; when \par his orders are not clear and distinct;\par \par [Wei Liao Tzu (ch. 4) says: "If the commander gives his \par orders with decision, the soldiers will not wait to hear them \par twice; if his moves are made without vacillation, the soldiers \par will not be in two minds about doing their duty." General Baden-\par Powell says, italicizing the words: "The secret of getting \par successful work out of your trained men lies in one nutshell--in \par the clearness of the instructions they receive." [3] Cf. also \par Wu Tzu ch. 3: "the most fatal defect in a military leader is \par difference; the worst calamities that befall an army arise from \par hesitation."]\par \par when there are no fixes duties assigned to officers and men,\par \par [Tu Mu says: "Neither officers nor men have any regular \par routine."]\par \par and the ranks are formed in a slovenly haphazard manner, the \par result is utter DISORGANIZATION.\par 19. When a general, unable to estimate the enemy's \par strength, allows an inferior force to engage a larger one, or \par hurls a weak detachment against a powerful one, and neglects to \par place picked soldiers in the front rank, the result must be ROUT.\par \par [Chang Yu paraphrases the latter part of the sentence and \par continues: "Whenever there is fighting to be done, the keenest \par spirits should be appointed to serve in the front ranks, both in \par order to strengthen the resolution of our own men and to \par demoralize the enemy." Cf. the primi ordines of Caesar ("De \par Bello Gallico," V. 28, 44, et al.).]\par \par 20. These are six ways of courting defeat, which must be \par carefully noted by the general who has attained a responsible \par post.\par \par [See supra, ss. 13.]\par \par 21. The natural formation of the country is the soldier's \par best ally;\par \par [Ch`en Hao says: "The advantages of weather and season are \par not equal to those connected with ground."]\par \par but a power of estimating the adversary, of controlling the \par forces of victory, and of shrewdly calculating difficulties, \par dangers and distances, constitutes the test of a great general.\par 22. He who knows these things, and in fighting puts his \par knowledge into practice, will win his battles. He who knows them \par not, nor practices them, will surely be defeated.\par 23. If fighting is sure to result in victory, then you must \par fight, even though the ruler forbid it; if fighting will not \par result in victory, then you must not fight even at the ruler's \par bidding.\par \par [Cf. VIII. ss. 3 fin. Huang Shih-kung of the Ch`in dynasty, \par who is said to have been the patron of Chang Liang and to have \par written the SAN LUEH, has these words attributed to him: "The \par responsibility of setting an army in motion must devolve on the \par general alone; if advance and retreat are controlled from the \par Palace, brilliant results will hardly be achieved. Hence the \par god-like ruler and the enlightened monarch are content to play a \par humble part in furthering their country's cause [lit., kneel down \par to push the chariot wheel]." This means that "in matters lying \par outside the zenana, the decision of the military commander must \par be absolute." Chang Yu also quote the saying: "Decrees from the \par Son of Heaven do not penetrate the walls of a camp."]\par 24. The general who advances without coveting fame and \par retreats without fearing disgrace,\par \par [It was Wellington, I think, who said that the hardest thing \par of all for a soldier is to retreat.]\par \par whose only thought is to protect his country and do good service \par for his sovereign, is the jewel of the kingdom.\par \par [A noble presentiment, in few words, of the Chinese "happy \par warrior." Such a man, says Ho Shih, "even if he had to suffer \par punishment, would not regret his conduct."]\par \par 25. Regard your soldiers as your children, and they will \par follow you into the deepest valleys; look upon them as your own \par beloved sons, and they will stand by you even unto death.\par \par [Cf. I. ss. 6. In this connection, Tu Mu draws for us an \par engaging picture of the famous general Wu Ch`i, from whose \par treatise on war I have frequently had occasion to quote: "He \par wore the same clothes and ate the same food as the meanest of his \par soldiers, refused to have either a horse to ride or a mat to \par sleep on, carried his own surplus rations wrapped in a parcel, \par and shared every hardship with his men. One of his soldiers was \par suffering from an abscess, and Wu Ch`i himself sucked out the \par virus. The soldier's mother, hearing this, began wailing and \par lamenting. Somebody asked her, saying: 'Why do you cry? Your \par son is only a common soldier, and yet the commander-in-chief \par himself has sucked the poison from his sore.' The woman replied, \par 'Many years ago, Lord Wu performed a similar service for my \par husband, who never left him afterwards, and finally met his death \par at the hands of the enemy. And now that he has done the same for \par my son, he too will fall fighting I know not where.'" Li Ch`uan \par mentions the Viscount of Ch`u, who invaded the small state of \par Hsiao during the winter. The Duke of Shen said to him: "Many of \par the soldiers are suffering severely from the cold." So he made a \par round of the whole army, comforting and encouraging the men; and \par straightway they felt as if they were clothed in garments lined \par with floss silk.]\par \par 26. If, however, you are indulgent, but unable to make your \par authority felt; kind-hearted, but unable to enforce your \par commands; and incapable, moreover, of quelling disorder: then \par your soldiers must be likened to spoilt children; they are \par useless for any practical purpose.\par \par [Li Ching once said that if you could make your soldiers \par afraid of you, they would not be afraid of the enemy. Tu Mu \par recalls an instance of stern military discipline which occurred \par in 219 A.D., when Lu Meng was occupying the town of Chiang-ling. \par He had given stringent orders to his army not to molest the \par inhabitants nor take anything from them by force. Nevertheless, \par a certain officer serving under his banner, who happened to be a \par fellow-townsman, ventured to appropriate a bamboo hat belonging \par to one of the people, in order to wear it over his regulation \par helmet as a protection against the rain. Lu Meng considered that \par the fact of his being also a native of Ju-nan should not be \par allowed to palliate a clear breach of discipline, and accordingly \par he ordered his summary execution, the tears rolling down his \par face, however, as he did so. This act of severity filled the \par army with wholesome awe, and from that time forth even articles \par dropped in the highway were not picked up.]\par \par 27. If we know that our own men are in a condition to \par attack, but are unaware that the enemy is not open to attack, we \par have gone only halfway towards victory.\par \par [That is, Ts`ao Kung says, "the issue in this case is \par uncertain."]\par \par 28. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, but are \par unaware that our own men are not in a condition to attack, we \par have gone only halfway towards victory.\par \par [Cf. III. ss. 13 (1).]\par \par 29. If we know that the enemy is open to attack, and also \par know that our men are in a condition to attack, but are unaware \par that the nature of the ground makes fighting impracticable, we \par have still gone only halfway towards victory.\par 30. Hence the experienced soldier, once in motion, is never \par bewildered; once he has broken camp, he is never at a loss.\par \par [The reason being, according to Tu Mu, that he has taken his \par measures so thoroughly as to ensure victory beforehand. "He does \par not move recklessly," says Chang Yu, "so that when he does move, \par he makes no mistakes."]\par \par 31. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and know \par yourself, your victory will not stand in doubt; if you know \par Heaven and know Earth, you may make your victory complete.\par \par [Li Ch`uan sums up as follows: "Given a knowledge of three \par things--the affairs of men, the seasons of heaven and the natural \par advantages of earth--, victory will invariably crown your \par battles."]\par \par \par [1] See "Pensees de Napoleon 1er," no. 47.\par \par [2] "The Science of War," chap. 2.\par \par [3] "Aids to Scouting," p. xii.\par \par -----------------------------------------------------------------\par \par XI. THE NINE SITUATIONS\par \par \par 1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war recognizes nine varieties \par of ground: (1) Dispersive ground; (2) facile ground; (3) \par contentious ground; (4) open ground; (5) ground of intersecting \par highways; (6) serious ground; (7) difficult ground; (8) hemmed-in \par ground; (9) desperate ground.\par 2. When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is \par dispersive ground.\par \par [So called because the soldiers, being near to their homes \par and anxious to see their wives and children, are likely to seize \par the opportunity afforded by a battle and scatter in every \par direction. "In their advance," observes Tu Mu, "they will lack \par the valor of desperation, and when they retreat, they will find \par harbors of refuge."]\par \par 3. When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no \par great distance, it is facile ground.\par \par [Li Ch`uan and Ho Shih say "because of the facility for \par retreating," and the other commentators give similar \par explanations. Tu Mu remarks: "When your army has crossed the \par border, you should burn your boats and bridges, in order to make \par it clear to everybody that you have no hankering after home."]\par \par 4. Ground the possession of which imports great advantage \par to either side, is contentious ground.\par \par [Tu Mu defines the ground as ground "to be contended for." \par Ts`ao Kung says: "ground on which the few and the weak can \par defeat the many and the strong," such as "the neck of a pass," \par instanced by Li Ch`uan. Thus, Thermopylae was of this \par classification because the possession of it, even for a few days \par only, meant holding the entire invading army in check and thus \par gaining invaluable time. Cf. Wu Tzu, ch. V. ad init.: "For \par those who have to fight in the ratio of one to ten, there is \par nothing better than a narrow pass." When Lu Kuang was returning \par from his triumphant expedition to Turkestan in 385 A.D., and had \par got as far as I-ho, laden with spoils, Liang Hsi, administrator \par of Liang-chou, taking advantage of the death of Fu Chien, King of \par Ch`in, plotted against him and was for barring his way into the \par province. Yang Han, governor of Kao-ch`ang, counseled him, \par saying: "Lu Kuang is fresh from his victories in the west, and \par his soldiers are vigorous and mettlesome. If we oppose him in \par the shifting sands of the desert, we shall be no match for him, \par and we must therefore try a different plan. Let us hasten to \par occupy the defile at the mouth of the Kao-wu pass, thus cutting \par him off from supplies of water, and when his troops are \par prostrated with thirst, we can dictate our own terms without \par moving. Or if you think that the pass I mention is too far off, \par we could make a stand against him at the I-wu pass, which is \par nearer. The cunning and resource of Tzu-fang himself would be \par expended in vain against the enormous strength of these two \par positions." Liang Hsi, refusing to act on this advice, was \par overwhelmed and swept away by the invader.]\par \par 5. Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is \par open ground.\par \par [There are various interpretations of the Chinese adjective \par for this type of ground. Ts`ao Kung says it means "ground \par covered with a network of roads," like a chessboard. Ho Shih \par suggested: "ground on which intercommunication is easy."]\par \par 6. Ground which forms the key to three contiguous states,\par \par [Ts`au Kung defines this as: "Our country adjoining the \par enemy's and a third country conterminous with both." Meng Shih \par instances the small principality of Cheng, which was bounded on \par the north-east by Ch`i, on the west by Chin, and on the south by \par Ch`u.]\par \par so that he who occupies it first has most of the Empire at his \par command,\par \par [The belligerent who holds this dominating position can \par constrain most of them to become his allies.]\par \par is a ground of intersecting highways.\par 7. When an army has penetrated into the heart of a hostile \par country, leaving a number of fortified cities in its rear, it is \par serious ground.\par \par [Wang Hsi explains the name by saying that "when an army has \par reached such a point, its situation is serious."]\par \par 8. Mountain forests,\par \par [Or simply "forests."]\par \par rugged steeps, marshes and fens--all country that is hard to \par traverse: this is difficult ground.\par 9. Ground which is reached through narrow gorges, and from \par which we can only retire by tortuous paths, so that a small \par number of the enemy would suffice to crush a large body of our \par men: this is hemmed in ground.\par 10. Ground on which we can only be saved from destruction \par by fighting without delay, is desperate ground.\par \par [The situation, as pictured by Ts`ao Kung, is very similar \par to the "hemmed-in ground" except that here escape is no longer \par possible: "A lofty mountain in front, a large river behind, \par advance impossible, retreat blocked." Ch`en Hao says: "to be on \par 'desperate ground' is like sitting in a leaking boat or crouching \par in a burning house." Tu Mu quotes from Li Ching a vivid \par description of the plight of an army thus entrapped: "Suppose an \par army invading hostile territory without the aid of local guides: \par -- it falls into a fatal snare and is at the enemy's mercy. A \par ravine on the left, a mountain on the right, a pathway so \par perilous that the horses have to be roped together and the \par chariots carried in slings, no passage open in front, retreat cut \par off behind, no choice but to proceed in single file. Then, \par before there is time to range our soldiers in order of battle, \par the enemy is overwhelming strength suddenly appears on the scene. \par Advancing, we can nowhere take a breathing-space; retreating, we \par have no haven of refuge. We seek a pitched battle, but in vain; \par yet standing on the defensive, none of us has a moment's respite. \par If we simply maintain our ground, whole days and months will \par crawl by; the moment we make a move, we have to sustain the \par enemy's attacks on front and rear. The country is wild, \par destitute of water and plants; the army is lacking in the \par necessaries of life, the horses are jaded and the men worn-out, \par all the resources of strength and skill unavailing, the pass so \par narrow that a single man defending it can check the onset of ten \par thousand; all means of offense in the hands of the enemy, all \par points of vantage already forfeited by ourselves:--in this \par terrible plight, even though we had the most valiant soldiers and \par the keenest of weapons, how could they be employed with the \par slightest effect?" Students of Greek history may be reminded of \par the awful close to the Sicilian expedition, and the agony of the \par Athenians under Nicias and Demonsthenes. [See Thucydides, VII. \par 78 sqq.].]\par \par 11. On dispersive ground, therefore, fight not. On facile \par ground, halt not. On contentious ground, attack not.\par \par [But rather let all your energies be bent on occupying the \par advantageous position first. So Ts`ao Kung. Li Ch`uan and \par others, however, suppose the meaning to be that the enemy has \par already forestalled us, sot that it would be sheer madness to \par attack. In the SUN TZU HSU LU, when the King of Wu inquires what \par should be done in this case, Sun Tzu replies: "The rule with \par regard to contentious ground is that those in possession have the \par advantage over the other side. If a position of this kind is \par secured first by the enemy, beware of attacking him. Lure him \par away by pretending to flee--show your banners and sound your \par drums--make a dash for other places that he cannot afford to \par lose--trail brushwood and raise a dust--confound his ears and \par eyes--detach a body of your best troops, and place it secretly in \par ambuscade. Then your opponent will sally forth to the rescue."]\par \par 12. On open ground, do not try to block the enemy's way.\par \par [Because the attempt would be futile, and would expose the \par blocking force itself to serious risks. There are two \par interpretations available here. I follow that of Chang Yu. The \par other is indicated in Ts`ao Kung's brief note: "Draw closer \par together"--i.e., see that a portion of your own army is not cut \par off.]\par \par On the ground of intersecting highways, join hands with your \par allies.\par \par [Or perhaps, "form alliances with neighboring states."]\par \par 13. On serious ground, gather in plunder.\par \par [On this, Li Ch`uan has the following delicious note: "When \par an army penetrates far into the enemy's country, care must be \par taken not to alienate the people by unjust treatment. Follow the \par example of the Han Emperor Kao Tsu, whose march into Ch`in \par territory was marked by no violation of women or looting of \par valuables. [Nota bene: this was in 207 B.C., and may well cause \par us to blush for the Christian armies that entered Peking in 1900 \par A.D.] Thus he won the hearts of all. In the present passage, \par then, I think that the true reading must be, not 'plunder,' but \par 'do not plunder.'" Alas, I fear that in this instance the worthy \par commentator's feelings outran his judgment. Tu Mu, at least, has \par no such illusions. He says: "When encamped on 'serious ground,' \par there being no inducement as yet to advance further, and no \par possibility of retreat, one ought to take measures for a \par protracted resistance by bringing in provisions from all sides, \par and keep a close watch on the enemy."]\par \par In difficult ground, keep steadily on the march.\par \par [Or, in the words of VIII. ss. 2, "do not encamp.]\par \par 14. On hemmed-in ground, resort to stratagem.\par \par [Ts`au Kung says: "Try the effect of some unusual \par artifice;" and Tu Yu amplifies this by saying: "In such a \par position, some scheme must be devised which will suit the \par circumstances, and if we can succeed in deluding the enemy, the \par peril may be escaped." This is exactly what happened on the \par famous occasion when Hannibal was hemmed in among the mountains \par on the road to Casilinum, and to all appearances entrapped by the \par dictator Fabius. The stratagem which Hannibal devised to baffle \par his foes was remarkably like that which T`ien Tan had also \par employed with success exactly 62 years before. [See IX. ss. 24, \par note.] When night came on, bundles of twigs were fastened to the \par horns of some 2000 oxen and set on fire, the terrified animals \par being then quickly driven along the mountain side towards the \par passes which were beset by the enemy. The strange spectacle of \par these rapidly moving lights so alarmed and discomfited the Romans \par that they withdrew from their position, and Hannibal's army \par passed safely through the defile. [See Polybius, III. 93, 94; \par Livy, XXII. 16 17.]\par \par On desperate ground, fight.\par \par [For, as Chia Lin remarks: "if you fight with all your \par might, there is a chance of life; where as death is certain if \par you cling to your corner."]\par \par 15. Those who were called skillful leaders of old knew how \par to drive a wedge between the enemy's front and rear;\par \par [More literally, "cause the front and rear to lose touch \par with each other."]\par \par to prevent co-operation between his large and small divisions; to \par hinder the good troops from rescuing the bad, the officers from \par rallying their men.\par 16. When the enemy's men were united, they managed to keep \par them in disorder.\par 17. When it was to their advantage, they made a forward \par move; when otherwise, they stopped still.\par \par [Mei Yao-ch`en connects this with the foregoing: "Having \par succeeded in thus dislocating the enemy, they would push forward \par in order to secure any advantage to be gained; if there was no \par advantage to be gained, they would remain where they were."]\par \par 18. If asked how to cope with a great host of the enemy in \par orderly array and on the point of marching to the attack, I \par should say: "Begin by seizing something which your opponent \par holds dear; then he will be amenable to your will."\par \par [Opinions differ as to what Sun Tzu had in mind. Ts`ao Kung \par thinks it is "some strategical advantage on which the enemy is \par depending." Tu Mu says: "The three things which an enemy is \par anxious to do, and on the accomplishment of which his success \par depends, are: (1) to capture our favorable positions; (2) to \par ravage our cultivated land; (3) to guard his own communications." \par Our object then must be to thwart his plans in these three \par directions and thus render him helpless. [Cf. III. ss. 3.] By \par boldly seizing the initiative in this way, you at once throw the \par other side on the defensive.]\par \par 19. Rapidity is the essence of war:\par \par [According to Tu Mu, "this is a summary of leading \par principles in warfare," and he adds: "These are the profoundest \par truths of military science, and the chief business of the \par general." The following anecdotes, told by Ho Shih, shows the \par importance attached to speed by two of China's greatest generals. \par In 227 A.D., Meng Ta, governor of Hsin-ch`eng under the Wei \par Emperor Wen Ti, was meditating defection to the House of Shu, and \par had entered into correspondence with Chu-ko Liang, Prime Minister \par of that State. The Wei general Ssu-ma I was then military \par governor of Wan, and getting wind of Meng Ta's treachery, he at \par once set off with an army to anticipate his revolt, having \par previously cajoled him by a specious message of friendly import. \par Ssu-ma's officers came to him and said: "If Meng Ta has leagued \par himself with Wu and Shu, the matter should be thoroughly \par investigated before we make a move." Ssu-ma I replied: "Meng Ta \par is an unprincipled man, and we ought to go and punish him at \par once, while he is still wavering and before he has thrown off the \par mask." Then, by a series of forced marches, be brought his army \par under the walls of Hsin-ch`eng with in a space of eight days. \par Now Meng Ta had previously said in a letter to Chu-ko Liang: \par "Wan is 1200 LI from here. When the news of my revolt reaches \par Ssu-ma I, he will at once inform his imperial master, but it will \par be a whole month before any steps can be taken, and by that time \par my city will be well fortified. Besides, Ssu-ma I is sure not to \par come himself, and the generals that will be sent against us are \par not worth troubling about." The next letter, however, was filled \par with consternation: "Though only eight days have passed since I \par threw off my allegiance, an army is already at the city-gates. \par What miraculous rapidity is this!" A fortnight later, Hsin-\par ch`eng had fallen and Meng Ta had lost his head. [See \par CHIN SHU, ch. 1, f. 3.] In 621 A.D., Li Ching was sent from \par K`uei-chou in Ssu-ch`uan to reduce the successful rebel Hsiao \par Hsien, who had set up as Emperor at the modern Ching-chou Fu in \par Hupeh. It was autumn, and the Yangtsze being then in flood, \par Hsiao Hsien never dreamt that his adversary would venture to come \par down through the gorges, and consequently made no preparations. \par But Li Ching embarked his army without loss of time, and was just \par about to start when the other generals implored him to postpone \par his departure until the river was in a less dangerous state for \par navigation. Li Ching replied: "To the soldier, overwhelming \par speed is of paramount importance, and he must never miss \par opportunities. Now is the time to strike, before Hsiao Hsien \par even knows that we have got an army together. If we seize the \par present moment when the river is in flood, we shall appear before \par his capital with startling suddenness, like the thunder which is \par heard before you have time to stop your ears against it. [See \par VII. ss. 19, note.] This is the great principle in war. Even if \par he gets to know of our approach, he will have to levy his \par soldiers in such a hurry that they will not be fit to oppose us. \par Thus the full fruits of victory will be ours." All came about as \par he predicted, and Hsiao Hsien was obliged to surrender, nobly \par stipulating that his people should be spared and he alone suffer \par the penalty of death.]\par \par take advantage of the enemy's unreadiness, make your way by \par unexpected routes, and attack unguarded spots.\par 20. The following are the principles to be observed by an \par invading force: The further you penetrate into a country, the \par greater will be the solidarity of your troops, and thus the \par defenders will not prevail against you.\par 21. Make forays in fertile country in order to supply your \par army with food.\par \par [Cf. supra, ss. 13. Li Ch`uan does not venture on a note \par here.]\par \par 22. Carefully study the well-being of your men,\par \par [For "well-being", Wang Hsi means, "Pet them, humor them, \par give them plenty of food and drink, and look after them \par generally."]\par \par and do not overtax them. Concentrate your energy and hoard your \par strength.\par \par [Ch`en recalls the line of action adopted in 224 B.C. by the \par famous general Wang Chien, whose military genius largely \par contributed to the success of the First Emperor. He had invaded \par the Ch`u State, where a universal levy was made to oppose him. \par But, being doubtful of the temper of his troops, he declined all \par invitations to fight and remained strictly on the defensive. In \par vain did the Ch`u general try to force a battle: day after day \par Wang Chien kept inside his walls and would not come out, but \par devoted his whole time and energy to winning the affection and \par confidence of his men. He took care that they should be well \par fed, sharing his own meals with them, provided facilities for \par bathing, and employed every method of judicious indulgence to \par weld them into a loyal and homogenous body. After some time had \par elapsed, he told off certain persons to find out how the men were \par amusing themselves. The answer was, that they were contending \par with one another in putting the weight and long-jumping. When \par Wang Chien heard that they were engaged in these athletic \par pursuits, he knew that their spirits had been strung up to the \par required pitch and that they were now ready for fighting. By \par this time the Ch`u army, after repeating their challenge again \par and again, had marched away eastwards in disgust. The Ch`in \par general immediately broke up his camp and followed them, and in \par the battle that ensued they were routed with great slaughter. \par Shortly afterwards, the whole of Ch`u was conquered by Ch`in, and \par the king Fu-ch`u led into captivity.]\par \par Keep your army continually on the move,\par \par [In order that the enemy may never know exactly where you \par are. It has struck me, however, that the true reading might be \par "link your army together."]\par \par and devise unfathomable plans.\par 23. Throw your soldiers into positions whence there is no \par escape, and they will prefer death to flight. If they will face \par death, there is nothing they may not achieve.\par \par [Chang Yu quotes his favorite Wei Liao Tzu (ch. 3): "If one \par man were to run amok with a sword in the market-place, and \par everybody else tried to get our of his way, I should not allow \par that this man alone had courage and that all the rest were \par contemptible cowards. The truth is, that a desperado and a man \par who sets some value on his life do not meet on even terms."]\par \par Officers and men alike will put forth their uttermost strength.\par \par [Chang Yu says: "If they are in an awkward place together, \par they will surely exert their united strength to get out of it."]\par \par 24. Soldiers when in desperate straits lose the sense of \par fear. If there is no place of refuge, they will stand firm. If \par they are in hostile country, they will show a stubborn front. If \par there is no help for it, they will fight hard.\par 25. Thus, without waiting to be marshaled, the soldiers \par will be constantly on the qui vive; without waiting to be asked, \par they will do your will;\par \par [Literally, "without asking, you will get."]\par \par without restrictions, they will be faithful; without giving \par orders, they can be trusted.\par 26. Prohibit the taking of omens, and do away with \par superstitious doubts. Then, until death itself comes, no \par calamity need be feared.\par \par [The superstitious, "bound in to saucy doubts and fears," \par degenerate into cowards and "die many times before their deaths." \par Tu Mu quotes Huang Shih-kung: "'Spells and incantations should \par be strictly forbidden, and no officer allowed to inquire by \par divination into the fortunes of an army, for fear the soldiers' \par minds should be seriously perturbed.' The meaning is," he \par continues, "that if all doubts and scruples are discarded, your \par men will never falter in their resolution until they die."]\par \par 27. If our soldiers are not overburdened with money, it is \par not because they have a distaste for riches; if their lives are \par not unduly long, it is not because they are disinclined to \par longevity.\par \par [Chang Yu has the best note on this passage: "Wealth and \par long life are things for which all men have a natural \par inclination. Hence, if they burn or fling away valuables, and \par sacrifice their own lives, it is not that they dislike them, but \par simply that they have no choice." Sun Tzu is slyly insinuating \par that, as soldiers are but human, it is for the general to see \par that temptations to shirk fighting and grow rich are not thrown \par in their way.]\par \par 28. On the day they are ordered out to battle, your \par soldiers may weep,\par \par [The word in the Chinese is "snivel." This is taken to \par indicate more genuine grief than tears alone.]\par \par those sitting up bedewing their garments, and those lying down \par letting the tears run down their cheeks.\par \par [Not because they are afraid, but because, as Ts`ao Kung \par says, "all have embraced the firm resolution to do or die." We \par may remember that the heroes of the Iliad were equally childlike \par in showing their emotion. Chang Yu alludes to the mournful \par parting at the I River between Ching K`o and his friends, when \par the former was sent to attempt the life of the King of Ch`in \par (afterwards First Emperor) in 227 B.C. The tears of all flowed \par down like rain as he bade them farewell and uttered the following \par lines: "The shrill blast is blowing, Chilly the burn; Your \par champion is going--Not to return." [1] ]\par \par But let them once be brought to bay, and they will display the \par courage of a Chu or a Kuei.\par \par [Chu was the personal name of Chuan Chu, a native of the Wu \par State and contemporary with Sun Tzu himself, who was employed by \par Kung-tzu Kuang, better known as Ho Lu Wang, to assassinate his \par sovereign Wang Liao with a dagger which he secreted in the belly \par of a fish served up at a banquet. He succeeded in his attempt, \par but was immediately hacked to pieced by the king's bodyguard. \par This was in 515 B.C. The other hero referred to, Ts`ao Kuei (or \par Ts`ao Mo), performed the exploit which has made his name famous \par 166 years earlier, in 681 B.C. Lu had been thrice defeated by \par Ch`i, and was just about to conclude a treaty surrendering a \par large slice of territory, when Ts`ao Kuei suddenly seized Huan \par Kung, the Duke of Ch`i, as he stood on the altar steps and held a \par dagger against his chest. None of the duke's retainers dared to \par move a muscle, and Ts`ao Kuei proceeded to demand full \par restitution, declaring the Lu was being unjustly treated because \par she was a smaller and a weaker state. Huan Kung, in peril of his \par life, was obliged to consent, whereupon Ts`ao Kuei flung away his \par dagger and quietly resumed his place amid the terrified \par assemblage without having so much as changed color. As was to be \par expected, the Duke wanted afterwards to repudiate the bargain, \par but his wise old counselor Kuan Chung pointed out to him the \par impolicy of breaking his word, and the upshot was that this bold \par stroke regained for Lu the whole of what she had lost in three \par pitched battles.]\par \par 29. The skillful tactician may be likened to the SHUAI-JAN. \par Now the SHUAI-JAN is a snake that is found in the Ch`ang \par mountains.\par \par ["Shuai-jan" means "suddenly" or "rapidly," and the snake in \par question was doubtless so called owing to the rapidity of its \par movements. Through this passage, the term in the Chinese has now \par come to be used in the sense of "military maneuvers."]\par \par Strike at its head, and you will be attacked by its tail; strike \par at its tail, and you will be attacked by its head; strike at its \par middle, and you will be attacked by head and tail both.\par 30. Asked if an army can be made to imitate the SHUAI-JAN,\par \par [That is, as Mei Yao-ch`en says, "Is it possible to make the \par front and rear of an army each swiftly responsive to attack on \par the other, just as though they were part of a single living \par body?"]\par \par I should answer, Yes. For the men of Wu and the men of Yueh are \par enemies;\par \par [Cf. VI. ss. 21.]\par \par yet if they are crossing a river in the same boat and are caught \par by a storm, they will come to each other's assistance just as the \par left hand helps the right.\par \par [The meaning is: If two enemies will help each other in a \par time of common peril, how much more should two parts of the same \par army, bound together as they are by every tie of interest and \par fellow-feeling. Yet it is notorious that many a campaign has \par been ruined through lack of cooperation, especially in the case \par of allied armies.]\par \par 31. Hence it is not enough to put one's trust in the \par tethering of horses, and the burying of chariot wheels in the \par ground\par \par [These quaint devices to prevent one's army from running \par away recall the Athenian hero Sophanes, who carried the anchor \par with him at the battle of Plataea, by means of which he fastened \par himself firmly to one spot. [See Herodotus, IX. 74.] It is not \par enough, says Sun Tzu, to render flight impossible by such \par mechanical means. You will not succeed unless your men have \par tenacity and unity of purpose, and, above all, a spirit of \par sympathetic cooperation. This is the lesson which can be learned \par from the SHUAI-JAN.]\par \par 32. The principle on which to manage an army is to set up \par one standard of courage which all must reach.\par \par [Literally, "level the courage [of all] as though [it were \par that of] one." If the ideal army is to form a single organic \par whole, then it follows that the resolution and spirit of its \par component parts must be of the same quality, or at any rate must \par not fall below a certain standard. Wellington's seemingly \par ungrateful description of his army at Waterloo as "the worst he \par had ever commanded" meant no more than that it was deficient in \par this important particular--unity of spirit and courage. Had he \par not foreseen the Belgian defections and carefully kept those \par troops in the background, he would almost certainly have lost the \par day.]\par \par 33. How to make the best of both strong and weak--that is a \par question involving the proper use of ground.\par \par [Mei Yao-ch`en's paraphrase is: "The way to eliminate the \par differences of strong and weak and to make both serviceable is to \par utilize accidental features of the ground." Less reliable \par troops, if posted in strong positions, will hold out as long as \par better troops on more exposed terrain. The advantage of position \par neutralizes the inferiority in stamina and courage. Col. \par Henderson says: "With all respect to the text books, and to the \par ordinary tactical teaching, I am inclined to think that the study \par of ground is often overlooked, and that by no means sufficient \par importance is attached to the selection of positions... and to \par the immense advantages that are to be derived, whether you are \par defending or attacking, from the proper utilization of natural \par features." [2] ]\par \par 34. Thus the skillful general conducts his army just as \par though he were leading a single man, willy-nilly, by the hand.\par \par [Tu Mu says: "The simile has reference to the ease with \par which he does it."]\par \par 35. It is the business of a general to be quiet and thus \par ensure secrecy; upright and just, and thus maintain order.\par 36. He must be able to mystify his officers and men by \par false reports and appearances,\par \par [Literally, "to deceive their eyes and ears."]\par \par and thus keep them in total ignorance.\par \par [Ts`ao Kung gives us one of his excellent apophthegms: "The \par troops must not be allowed to share your schemes in the \par beginning; they may only rejoice with you over their happy \par outcome." "To mystify, mislead, and surprise the enemy," is one \par of the first principles in war, as had been frequently pointed \par out. But how about the other process--the mystification of one's \par own men? Those who may think that Sun Tzu is over-emphatic on \par this point would do well to read Col. Henderson's remarks on \par Stonewall Jackson's Valley campaign: "The infinite pains," he \par says, "with which Jackson sought to conceal, even from his most \par trusted staff officers, his movements, his intentions, and his \par thoughts, a commander less thorough would have pronounced \par useless"--etc. etc. [3] In the year 88 A.D., as we read in ch. \par 47 of the HOU HAN SHU, "Pan Ch`ao took the field with 25,000 men \par from Khotan and other Central Asian states with the object of \par crushing Yarkand. The King of Kutcha replied by dispatching his \par chief commander to succor the place with an army drawn from the \par kingdoms of Wen-su, Ku-mo, and Wei-t`ou, totaling 50,000 men. \par Pan Ch`ao summoned his officers and also the King of Khotan to a \par council of war, and said: 'Our forces are now outnumbered and \par unable to make head against the enemy. The best plan, then, is \par for us to separate and disperse, each in a different direction. \par The King of Khotan will march away by the easterly route, and I \par will then return myself towards the west. Let us wait until the \par evening drum has sounded and then start.' Pan Ch`ao now secretly \par released the prisoners whom he had taken alive, and the King of \par Kutcha was thus informed of his plans. Much elated by the news, \par the latter set off at once at the head of 10,000 horsemen to bar \par Pan Ch`ao's retreat in the west, while the King of Wen-su rode \par eastward with 8000 horse in order to intercept the King of \par Khotan. As soon as Pan Ch`ao knew that the two chieftains had \par gone, he called his divisions together, got them well in hand, \par and at cock-crow hurled them against the army of Yarkand, as it \par lay encamped. The barbarians, panic-stricken, fled in confusion, \par and were closely pursued by Pan Ch`ao. Over 5000 heads were \par brought back as trophies, besides immense spoils in the shape of \par horses and cattle and valuables of every description. Yarkand \par then capitulating, Kutcha and the other kingdoms drew off their \par respective forces. From that time forward, Pan Ch`ao's prestige \par completely overawed the countries of the west." In this case, we \par see that the Chinese general not only kept his own officers in \par ignorance of his real plans, but actually took the bold step of \par dividing his army in order to deceive the enemy.]\par \par 37. By altering his arrangements and changing his plans,\par \par [Wang Hsi thinks that this means not using the same \par stratagem twice.]\par \par he keeps the enemy without definite knowledge.\par \par [Chang Yu, in a quotation from another work, says: "The \par axiom, that war is based on deception, does not apply only to \par deception of the enemy. You must deceive even your own soldiers. \par Make them follow you, but without letting them know why."]\par \par By shifting his camp and taking circuitous routes, he prevents \par the enemy from anticipating his purpose.\par 38. At the critical moment, the leader of an army acts like \par one who has climbed up a height and then kicks away the ladder \par behind him. He carries his men deep into hostile territory \par before he shows his hand.\par \par [Literally, "releases the spring" (see V. ss. 15), that is, \par takes some decisive step which makes it impossible for the army \par to return--like Hsiang Yu, who sunk his ships after crossing a \par river. Ch`en Hao, followed by Chia Lin, understands the words \par less well as "puts forth every artifice at his command."]\par \par 39. He burns his boats and breaks his cooking-pots; like a \par shepherd driving a flock of sheep, he drives his men this way and \par that, and nothing knows whither he is going.\par \par [Tu Mu says: "The army is only cognizant of orders to \par advance or retreat; it is ignorant of the ulterior ends of \par attacking and conquering."]\par \par 40. To muster his host and bring it into danger:--this may \par be termed the business of the general.\par \par [Sun Tzu means that after mobilization there should be no \par delay in aiming a blow at the enemy's heart. Note how he returns \par again and again to this point. Among the warring states of \par ancient China, desertion was no doubt a much more present fear \par and serious evil than it is in the armies of today.]\par \par 41. The different measures suited to the nine varieties of \par ground;\par \par [Chang Yu says: "One must not be hide-bound in interpreting \par the rules for the nine varieties of ground.]\par \par the expediency of aggressive or defensive tactics; and the \par fundamental laws of human nature: these are things that must \par most certainly be studied.\par 42. When invading hostile territory, the general principle \par is, that penetrating deeply brings cohesion; penetrating but a \par short way means dispersion.\par \par [Cf. supra, ss. 20.]\par \par 43. When you leave your own country behind, and take your \par army across neighborhood territory, you find yourself on critical \par ground.\par \par [This "ground" is curiously mentioned in VIII. ss. 2, but it \par does not figure among the Nine Situations or the Six Calamities \par in chap. X. One's first impulse would be to translate it distant \par ground," but this, if we can trust the commentators, is precisely \par what is not meant here. Mei Yao-ch`en says it is "a position not \par far enough advanced to be called 'facile,' and not near enough to \par home to be 'dispersive,' but something between the two." Wang Hsi \par says: "It is ground separated from home by an interjacent state, \par whose territory we have had to cross in order to reach it. \par Hence, it is incumbent on us to settle our business there \par quickly." He adds that this position is of rare occurrence, \par which is the reason why it is not included among the Nine \par Situations.]\par \par When there are means of communication on all four sides, the \par ground is one of intersecting highways.\par 44. When you penetrate deeply into a country, it is serious \par ground. When you penetrate but a little way, it is facile \par ground.\par 45. When you have the enemy's strongholds on your rear, and \par narrow passes in front, it is hemmed-in ground. When there is no \par place of refuge at all, it is desperate ground.\par 46. Therefore, on dispersive ground, I would inspire my men \par with unity of purpose.\par \par [This end, according to Tu Mu, is best attained by remaining \par on the defensive, and avoiding battle. Cf. supra, ss. 11.]\par \par On facile ground, I would see that there is close connection \par between all parts of my army.\par \par [As Tu Mu says, the object is to guard against two possible \par contingencies: "(1) the desertion of our own troops; (2) a \par sudden attack on the part of the enemy." Cf. VII. ss. 17. Mei \par Yao-ch`en says: "On the march, the regiments should be in close \par touch; in an encampment, there should be continuity between the \par fortifications."]\par \par 47. On contentious ground, I would hurry up my rear.\par \par [This is Ts`ao Kung's interpretation. Chang Yu adopts it, \par saying: "We must quickly bring up our rear, so that head and \par tail may both reach the goal." That is, they must not be allowed \par to straggle up a long way apart. Mei Yao-ch`en offers another \par equally plausible explanation: "Supposing the enemy has not yet \par reached the coveted position, and we are behind him, we should \par advance with all speed in order to dispute its possession." \par Ch`en Hao, on the other hand, assuming that the enemy has had \par time to select his own ground, quotes VI. ss. 1, where Sun Tzu \par warns us against coming exhausted to the attack. His own idea of \par the situation is rather vaguely expressed: "If there is a \par favorable position lying in front of you, detach a picked body of \par troops to occupy it, then if the enemy, relying on their numbers, \par come up to make a fight for it, you may fall quickly on their \par rear with your main body, and victory will be assured." It was \par thus, he adds, that Chao She beat the army of Ch`in. (See p. \par 57.)]\par \par 48. On open ground, I would keep a vigilant eye on my \par defenses. On ground of intersecting highways, I would \par consolidate my alliances.\par 49. On serious ground, I would try to ensure a continuous \par stream of supplies.\par \par [The commentators take this as referring to forage and \par plunder, not, as one might expect, to an unbroken communication \par with a home base.]\par \par On difficult ground, I would keep pushing on along the road.\par 50. On hemmed-in ground, I would block any way of retreat.\par \par [Meng Shih says: "To make it seem that I meant to defend \par the position, whereas my real intention is to burst suddenly \par through the enemy's lines." Mei Yao-ch`en says: "in order to \par make my soldiers fight with desperation." Wang Hsi says, \par "fearing lest my men be tempted to run away." Tu Mu points out \par that this is the converse of VII. ss. 36, where it is the enemy \par who is surrounded. In 532 A.D., Kao Huan, afterwards Emperor and \par canonized as Shen-wu, was surrounded by a great army under Erh-\par chu Chao and others. His own force was comparatively small, \par consisting only of 2000 horse and something under 30,000 foot. \par The lines of investment had not been drawn very closely together, \par gaps being left at certain points. But Kao Huan, instead of \par trying to escape, actually made a shift to block all the \par remaining outlets himself by driving into them a number of oxen \par and donkeys roped together. As soon as his officers and men saw \par that there was nothing for it but to conquer or die, their \par spirits rose to an extraordinary pitch of exaltation, and they \par charged with such desperate ferocity that the opposing ranks \par broke and crumbled under their onslaught.]\par \par On desperate ground, I would proclaim to my soldiers the \par hopelessness of saving their lives.\par \par Tu Yu says: "Burn your baggage and impedimenta, throw away \par your stores and provisions, choke up the wells, destroy your \par cooking-stoves, and make it plain to your men that they cannot \par survive, but must fight to the death." Mei Yao-ch`en says: "The \par only chance of life lies in giving up all hope of it." This \par concludes what Sun Tzu has to say about "grounds" and the \par "variations" corresponding to them. Reviewing the passages which \par bear on this important subject, we cannot fail to be struck by \par the desultory and unmethodical fashion in which it is treated. \par Sun Tzu begins abruptly in VIII. ss. 2 to enumerate "variations" \par before touching on "grounds" at all, but only mentions five, \par namely nos. 7, 5, 8 and 9 of the subsequent list, and one that is \par not included in it. A few varieties of ground are dealt with in \par the earlier portion of chap. IX, and then chap. X sets forth six \par new grounds, with six variations of plan to match. None of these \par is mentioned again, though the first is hardly to be \par distinguished from ground no. 4 in the next chapter. At last, in \par chap. XI, we come to the Nine Grounds par excellence, immediately \par followed by the variations. This takes us down to ss. 14. In \par SS. 43-45, fresh definitions are provided for nos. 5, 6, 2, 8 and \par 9 (in the order given), as well as for the tenth ground noticed \par in chap. VIII; and finally, the nine variations are enumerated \par once more from beginning to end, all, with the exception of 5, 6 \par and 7, being different from those previously given. Though it is \par impossible to account for the present state of Sun Tzu's text, a \par few suggestive facts maybe brought into prominence: (1) Chap. \par VIII, according to the title, should deal with nine variations, \par whereas only five appear. (2) It is an abnormally short chapter. \par (3) Chap. XI is entitled The Nine Grounds. Several of these are \par defined twice over, besides which there are two distinct lists of \par the corresponding variations. (4) The length of the chapter is \par disproportionate, being double that of any other except IX. I do \par not propose to draw any inferences from these facts, beyond the \par general conclusion that Sun Tzu's work cannot have come down to \par us in the shape in which it left his hands: chap. VIII is \par obviously defective and probably out of place, while XI seems to \par contain matter that has either been added by a later hand or \par ought to appear elsewhere.]\par \par 51. For it is the soldier's disposition to offer an \par obstinate resistance when surrounded, to fight hard when he \par cannot help himself, and to obey promptly when he has fallen into \par danger.\par \par [Chang Yu alludes to the conduct of Pan Ch`ao's devoted \par followers in 73 A.D. The story runs thus in the HOU HAN SHU, ch. \par 47: "When Pan Ch`ao arrived at Shan-shan, Kuang, the King of the \par country, received him at first with great politeness and respect; \par but shortly afterwards his behavior underwent a sudden change, \par and he became remiss and negligent. Pan Ch`ao spoke about this \par to the officers of his suite: 'Have you noticed,' he said, 'that \par Kuang's polite intentions are on the wane? This must signify \par that envoys have come from the Northern barbarians, and that \par consequently he is in a state of indecision, not knowing with \par which side to throw in his lot. That surely is the reason. The \par truly wise man, we are told, can perceive things before they have \par come to pass; how much more, then, those that are already \par manifest!' Thereupon he called one of the natives who had been \par assigned to his service, and set a trap for him, saying: 'Where \par are those envoys from the Hsiung-nu who arrived some day ago?' \par The man was so taken aback that between surprise and fear he \par presently blurted out the whole truth. Pan Ch`ao, keeping his \par informant carefully under lock and key, then summoned a general \par gathering of his officers, thirty-six in all, and began drinking \par with them. When the wine had mounted into their heads a little, \par he tried to rouse their spirit still further by addressing them \par thus: 'Gentlemen, here we are in the heart of an isolated \par region, anxious to achieve riches and honor by some great \par exploit. Now it happens that an ambassador from the Hsiung-no \par arrived in this kingdom only a few days ago, and the result is \par that the respectful courtesy extended towards us by our royal \par host has disappeared. Should this envoy prevail upon him to \par seize our party and hand us over to the Hsiung-no, our bones will \par become food for the wolves of the desert. What are we to do?' \par With one accord, the officers replied: 'Standing as we do in \par peril of our lives, we will follow our commander through life and \par death.' For the sequel of this adventure, see chap. XII. ss. 1, \par note.]\par \par 52. We cannot enter into alliance with neighboring princes \par until we are acquainted with their designs. We are not fit to \par lead an army on the march unless we are familiar with the face of \par the country--its mountains and forests, its pitfalls and \par precipices, its marshes and swamps. We shall be unable to turn \par natural advantages to account unless we make use of local guides.\par \par [These three sentences are repeated from VII. SS. 12-14 -- \par in order to emphasize their importance, the commentators seem to \par think. I prefer to regard them as interpolated here in order to \par form an antecedent to the following words. With regard to local \par guides, Sun Tzu might have added that there is always the risk of \par going wrong, either through their treachery or some \par misunderstanding such as Livy records (XXII. 13): Hannibal, we \par are told, ordered a guide to lead him into the neighborhood of \par Casinum, where there was an important pass to be occupied; but \par his Carthaginian accent, unsuited to the pronunciation of Latin \par names, caused the guide to understand Casilinum instead of \par Casinum, and turning from his proper route, he took the army in \par that direction, the mistake not being discovered until they had \par almost arrived.]\par \par 53. To be ignored of any one of the following four or five \par principles does not befit a warlike prince.\par 54. When a warlike prince attacks a powerful state, his \par generalship shows itself in preventing the concentration of the \par enemy's forces. He overawes his opponents, and their allies are \par prevented from joining against him.\par \par [Mei Tao-ch`en constructs one of the chains of reasoning \par that are so much affected by the Chinese: "In attacking a \par powerful state, if you can divide her forces, you will have a \par superiority in strength; if you have a superiority in strength, \par you will overawe the enemy; if you overawe the enemy, the \par neighboring states will be frightened; and if the neighboring \par states are frightened, the enemy's allies will be prevented from \par joining her." The following gives a stronger meaning: "If the \par great state has once been defeated (before she has had time to \par summon her allies), then the lesser states will hold aloof and \par refrain from massing their forces." Ch`en Hao and Chang Yu take \par the sentence in quite another way. The former says: "Powerful \par though a prince may be, if he attacks a large state, he will be \par unable to raise enough troops, and must rely to some extent on \par external aid; if he dispenses with this, and with overweening \par confidence in his own strength, simply tries to intimidate the \par enemy, he will surely be defeated." Chang Yu puts his view thus: \par "If we recklessly attack a large state, our own people will be \par discontented and hang back. But if (as will then be the case) \par our display of military force is inferior by half to that of the \par enemy, the other chieftains will take fright and refuse to join \par us."]\par \par 55. Hence he does not strive to ally himself with all and \par sundry, nor does he foster the power of other states. He carries \par out his own secret designs, keeping his antagonists in awe.\par \par [The train of thought, as said by Li Ch`uan, appears to be \par this: Secure against a combination of his enemies, "he can \par afford to reject entangling alliances and simply pursue his own \par secret designs, his prestige enable him to dispense with external \par friendships."]\par \par Thus he is able to capture their cities and overthrow their \par kingdoms.\par \par [This paragraph, though written many years before the Ch`in \par State became a serious menace, is not a bad summary of the policy \par by which the famous Six Chancellors gradually paved the way for \par her final triumph under Shih Huang Ti. Chang Yu, following up \par his previous note, thinks that Sun Tzu is condemning this \par attitude of cold-blooded selfishness and haughty isolation.]\par \par 56. Bestow rewards without regard to rule,\par \par [Wu Tzu (ch. 3) less wisely says: "Let advance be richly \par rewarded and retreat be heavily punished."]\par \par issue orders\par \par [Literally, "hang" or post up."]\par \par without regard to previous arrangements;\par \par ["In order to prevent treachery," says Wang Hsi. The \par general meaning is made clear by Ts`ao Kung's quotation from the \par SSU-MA FA: "Give instructions only on sighting the enemy; give \par rewards when you see deserving deeds." Ts`ao Kung's paraphrase: \par "The final instructions you give to your army should not \par correspond with those that have been previously posted up." \par Chang Yu simplifies this into "your arrangements should not be \par divulged beforehand." And Chia Lin says: "there should be no \par fixity in your rules and arrangements." Not only is there danger \par in letting your plans be known, but war often necessitates the \par entire reversal of them at the last moment.]\par \par and you will be able to handle a whole army as though you had to \par do with but a single man.\par \par [Cf. supra, ss. 34.]\par \par 57. Confront your soldiers with the deed itself; never let \par them know your design.\par \par [Literally, "do not tell them words;" i.e. do not give your \par reasons for any order. Lord Mansfield once told a junior \par colleague to "give no reasons" for his decisions, and the maxim \par is even more applicable to a general than to a judge.]\par \par When the outlook is bright, bring it before their eyes; but tell \par them nothing when the situation is gloomy.\par 58. Place your army in deadly peril, and it will survive; \par plunge it into desperate straits, and it will come off in safety.\par \par [These words of Sun Tzu were once quoted by Han Hsin in \par explanation of the tactics he employed in one of his most \par brilliant battles, already alluded to on p. 28. In 204 B.C., he \par was sent against the army of Chao, and halted ten miles from the \par mouth of the Ching-hsing pass, where the enemy had mustered in \par full force. Here, at midnight, he detached a body of 2000 light \par cavalry, every man of which was furnished with a red flag. Their \par instructions were to make their way through narrow defiles and \par keep a secret watch on the enemy. "When the men of Chao see me \par in full flight," Han Hsin said, "they will abandon their \par fortifications and give chase. This must be the sign for you to \par rush in, pluck down the Chao standards and set up the red banners \par of Han in their stead." Turning then to his other officers, he \par remarked: "Our adversary holds a strong position, and is not \par likely to come out and attack us until he sees the standard and \par drums of the commander-in-chief, for fear I should turn back and \par escape through the mountains." So saying, he first of all sent \par out a division consisting of 10,000 men, and ordered them to form \par in line of battle with their backs to the River Ti. Seeing this \par maneuver, the whole army of Chao broke into loud laughter. By \par this time it was broad daylight, and Han Hsin, displaying the \par generalissimo's flag, marched out of the pass with drums beating, \par and was immediately engaged by the enemy. A great battle \par followed, lasting for some time; until at length Han Hsin and his \par colleague Chang Ni, leaving drums and banner on the field, fled \par to the division on the river bank, where another fierce battle \par was raging. The enemy rushed out to pursue them and to secure \par the trophies, thus denuding their ramparts of men; but the two \par generals succeeded in joining the other army, which was fighting \par with the utmost desperation. The time had now come for the 2000 \par horsemen to play their part. As soon as they saw the men of Chao \par following up their advantage, they galloped behind the deserted \par walls, tore up the enemy's flags and replaced them by those of \par Han. When the Chao army looked back from the pursuit, the sight \par of these red flags struck them with terror. Convinced that the \par Hans had got in and overpowered their king, they broke up in wild \par disorder, every effort of their leader to stay the panic being in \par vain. Then the Han army fell on them from both sides and \par completed the rout, killing a number and capturing the rest, \par amongst whom was King Ya himself.... After the battle, some of \par Han Hsin's officers came to him and said: "In the ART OF WAR we \par are told to have a hill or tumulus on the right rear, and a river \par or marsh on the left front. [This appears to be a blend of Sun \par Tzu and T`ai Kung. See IX ss. 9, and note.] You, on the \par contrary, ordered us to draw up our troops with the river at our \par back. Under these conditions, how did you manage to gain the \par victory?" The general replied: "I fear you gentlemen have not \par studied the Art of War with sufficient care. Is it not written \par there: 'Plunge your army into desperate straits and it will come \par off in safety; place it in deadly peril and it will survive'? \par Had I taken the usual course, I should never have been able to \par bring my colleague round. What says the Military Classic--'Swoop \par down on the market-place and drive the men off to fight.' [This \par passage does not occur in the present text of Sun Tzu.] If I had \par not placed my troops in a position where they were obliged to \par fight for their lives, but had allowed each man to follow his own \par discretion, there would have been a general debandade, and it \par would have been impossible to do anything with them." The \par officers admitted the force of his argument, and said: "These \par are higher tactics than we should have been capable of." [See \par CH`IEN HAN SHU, ch. 34, ff. 4, 5.] ]\par \par 59. For it is precisely when a force has fallen into harm's \par way that is capable of striking a blow for victory.\par \par [Danger has a bracing effect.]\par \par 60. Success in warfare is gained by carefully accommodating \par ourselves to the enemy's purpose.\par \par [Ts`ao Kung says: "Feign stupidity"--by an appearance of \par yielding and falling in with the enemy's wishes. Chang Yu's note \par makes the meaning clear: "If the enemy shows an inclination to \par advance, lure him on to do so; if he is anxious to retreat, delay \par on purpose that he may carry out his intention." The object is \par to make him remiss and contemptuous before we deliver our \par attack.]\par \par 61. By persistently hanging on the enemy's flank,\par \par [I understand the first four words to mean "accompanying the \par enemy in one direction." Ts`ao Kung says: "unite the soldiers \par and make for the enemy." But such a violent displacement of \par characters is quite indefensible.]\par \par we shall succeed in the long run\par \par [Literally, "after a thousand LI."]\par \par in killing the commander-in-chief.\par \par [Always a great point with the Chinese.]\par \par 62. This is called ability to accomplish a thing by sheer \par cunning.\par 63. On the day that you take up your command, block the \par frontier passes, destroy the official tallies,\par \par [These were tablets of bamboo or wood, one half of which was \par issued as a permit or passport by the official in charge of a \par gate. Cf. the "border-warden" of LUN YU III. 24, who may have \par had similar duties. When this half was returned to him, within a \par fixed period, he was authorized to open the gate and let the \par traveler through.]\par \par and stop the passage of all emissaries.\par \par [Either to or from the enemy's country.]\par \par 64. Be stern in the council-chamber,\par \par [Show no weakness, and insist on your plans being ratified \par by the sovereign.]\par \par so that you may control the situation.\par \par [Mei Yao-ch`en understands the whole sentence to mean: Take \par the strictest precautions to ensure secrecy in your \par deliberations.]\par \par 65. If the enemy leaves a door open, you must rush in.\par 66. Forestall your opponent by seizing what he holds dear,\par \par [Cf. supra, ss. 18.]\par \par and subtly contrive to time his arrival on the ground.\par \par [Ch`en Hao`s explanation: "If I manage to seize a favorable \par position, but the enemy does not appear on the scene, the \par advantage thus obtained cannot be turned to any practical \par account. He who intends therefore, to occupy a position of \par importance to the enemy, must begin by making an artful \par appointment, so to speak, with his antagonist, and cajole him \par into going there as well." Mei Yao-ch`en explains that this \par "artful appointment" is to be made through the medium of the \par enemy's own spies, who will carry back just the amount of \par information that we choose to give them. Then, having cunningly \par disclosed our intentions, "we must manage, though starting after \par the enemy, to arrive before him (VII. ss. 4). We must start \par after him in order to ensure his marching thither; we must arrive \par before him in order to capture the place without trouble. Taken \par thus, the present passage lends some support to Mei Yao-ch`en's \par interpretation of ss. 47.]\par \par 67. Walk in the path defined by rule,\par \par [Chia Lin says: "Victory is the only thing that matters, \par and this cannot be achieved by adhering to conventional canons." \par It is unfortunate that this variant rests on very slight \par authority, for the sense yielded is certainly much more \par satisfactory. Napoleon, as we know, according to the veterans of \par the old school whom he defeated, won his battles by violating \par every accepted canon of warfare.]\par \par and accommodate yourself to the enemy until you can fight a \par decisive battle.\par \par [Tu Mu says: "Conform to the enemy's tactics until a \par favorable opportunity offers; then come forth and engage in a \par battle that shall prove decisive."]\par \par 68. At first, then, exhibit the coyness of a maiden, until \par the enemy gives you an opening; afterwards emulate the rapidity \par of a running hare, and it will be too late for the enemy to \par oppose you.\par \par [As the hare is noted for its extreme timidity, the \par comparison hardly appears felicitous. But of course Sun Tzu was \par thinking only of its speed. The words have been taken to mean: \par You must flee from the enemy as quickly as an escaping hare; but \par this is rightly rejected by Tu Mu.]\par \par \par [1] Giles' Biographical Dictionary, no. 399.\par \par [2] "The Science of War," p. 333.\par \par [3] "Stonewall Jackson," vol. I, p. 421.\par \par -----------------------------------------------------------------\par \par XII. THE ATTACK BY FIRE\par \par \par [Rather more than half the chapter (SS. 1-13) is devoted to \par the subject of fire, after which the author branches off into \par other topics.]\par \par 1. Sun Tzu said: There are five ways of attacking with \par fire. The first is to burn soldiers in their camp;\par \par [So Tu Mu. Li Ch`uan says: "Set fire to the camp, and kill \par the soldiers" (when they try to escape from the flames). Pan \par Ch`ao, sent on a diplomatic mission to the King of Shan-shan [see \par XI. ss. 51, note], found himself placed in extreme peril by the \par unexpected arrival of an envoy from the Hsiung-nu [the mortal \par enemies of the Chinese]. In consultation with his officers, he \par exclaimed: "Never venture, never win! [1] The only course open \par to us now is to make an assault by fire on the barbarians under \par cover of night, when they will not be able to discern our \par numbers. Profiting by their panic, we shall exterminate them \par completely; this will cool the King's courage and cover us with \par glory, besides ensuring the success of our mission.' the \par officers all replied that it would be necessary to discuss the \par matter first with the Intendant. Pan Ch`ao then fell into a \par passion: 'It is today,' he cried, 'that our fortunes must be \par decided! The Intendant is only a humdrum civilian, who on \par hearing of our project will certainly be afraid, and everything \par will be brought to light. An inglorious death is no worthy fate \par for valiant warriors.' All then agreed to do as he wished. \par Accordingly, as soon as night came on, he and his little band \par quickly made their way to the barbarian camp. A strong gale was \par blowing at the time. Pan Ch`ao ordered ten of the party to take \par drums and hide behind the enemy's barracks, it being arranged \par that when they saw flames shoot up, they should begin drumming \par and yelling with all their might. The rest of his men, armed \par with bows and crossbows, he posted in ambuscade at the gate of \par the camp. He then set fire to the place from the windward side, \par whereupon a deafening noise of drums and shouting arose on the \par front and rear of the Hsiung-nu, who rushed out pell-mell in \par frantic disorder. Pan Ch`ao slew three of them with his own \par hand, while his companions cut off the heads of the envoy and \par thirty of his suite. The remainder, more than a hundred in all, \par perished in the flames. On the following day, Pan Ch`ao, \par divining his thoughts, said with uplifted hand: 'Although you \par did not go with us last night, I should not think, Sir, of taking \par sole credit for our exploit.' This satisfied Kuo Hsun, and Pan \par Ch`ao, having sent for Kuang, King of Shan-shan, showed him the \par head of the barbarian envoy. The whole kingdom was seized with \par fear and trembling, which Pan Ch`ao took steps to allay by \par issuing a public proclamation. Then, taking the king's sons as \par hostage, he returned to make his report to Tou Ku." HOU HAN SHU, \par ch. 47, ff. 1, 2.] ]\par \par the second is to burn stores;\par \par [Tu Mu says: "Provisions, fuel and fodder." In order to \par subdue the rebellious population of Kiangnan, Kao Keng \par recommended Wen Ti of the Sui dynasty to make periodical raids \par and burn their stores of grain, a policy which in the long run \par proved entirely successful.]\par \par the third is to burn baggage trains;\par \par [An example given is the destruction of Yuan Shao`s wagons \par and impedimenta by Ts`ao Ts`ao in 200 A.D.]\par \par the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines;\par \par [Tu Mu says that the things contained in "arsenals" and \par "magazines" are the same. He specifies weapons and other \par implements, bullion and clothing. Cf. VII. ss. 11.]\par \par the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy.\par \par [Tu Yu says in the T`UNG TIEN: "To drop fire into the \par enemy's camp. The method by which this may be done is to set the \par tips of arrows alight by dipping them into a brazier, and then \par shoot them from powerful crossbows into the enemy's lines."]\par \par 2. In order to carry out an attack, we must have means \par available.\par \par [T`sao Kung thinks that "traitors in the enemy's camp" are \par referred to. But Ch`en Hao is more likely to be right in saying: \par "We must have favorable circumstances in general, not merely \par traitors to help us." Chia Lin says: "We must avail ourselves \par of wind and dry weather."]\par \par the material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness.\par \par [Tu Mu suggests as material for making fire: "dry vegetable \par matter, reeds, brushwood, straw, grease, oil, etc." Here we have \par the material cause. Chang Yu says: "vessels for hoarding fire, \par stuff for lighting fires."]\par \par 3. There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, \par and special days for starting a conflagration.\par 4. The proper season is when the weather is very dry; the \par special days are those when the moon is in the constellations of \par the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing or the Cross-bar;\par \par [These are, respectively, the 7th, 14th, 27th, and 28th of \par the Twenty-eight Stellar Mansions, corresponding roughly to \par Sagittarius, Pegasus, Crater and Corvus.]\par \par for these four are all days of rising wind.\par 5. In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet \par five possible developments:\par 6. (1) When fire breaks out inside to enemy's camp, respond \par at once with an attack from without.\par 7. (2) If there is an outbreak of fire, but the enemy's \par soldiers remain quiet, bide your time and do not attack.\par \par [The prime object of attacking with fire is to throw the \par enemy into confusion. If this effect is not produced, it means \par that the enemy is ready to receive us. Hence the necessity for \par caution.]\par \par 8. (3) When the force of the flames has reached its height, \par follow it up with an attack, if that is practicable; if not, stay \par where you are.\par \par [Ts`ao Kung says: "If you see a possible way, advance; but \par if you find the difficulties too great, retire."]\par \par 9. (4) If it is possible to make an assault with fire from \par without, do not wait for it to break out within, but deliver your \par attack at a favorable moment.\par \par [Tu Mu says that the previous paragraphs had reference to \par the fire breaking out (either accidentally, we may suppose, or by \par the agency of incendiaries) inside the enemy's camp. "But," he \par continues, "if the enemy is settled in a waste place littered \par with quantities of grass, or if he has pitched his camp in a \par position which can be burnt out, we must carry our fire against \par him at any seasonable opportunity, and not await on in hopes of \par an outbreak occurring within, for fear our opponents should \par themselves burn up the surrounding vegetation, and thus render \par our own attempts fruitless." The famous Li Ling once baffled the \par leader of the Hsiung-nu in this way. The latter, taking \par advantage of a favorable wind, tried to set fire to the Chinese \par general's camp, but found that every scrap of combustible \par vegetation in the neighborhood had already been burnt down. On \par the other hand, Po-ts`ai, a general of the Yellow Turban rebels, \par was badly defeated in 184 A.D. through his neglect of this simple \par precaution. "At the head of a large army he was besieging \par Ch`ang-she, which was held by Huang-fu Sung. The garrison was \par very small, and a general feeling of nervousness pervaded the \par ranks; so Huang-fu Sung called his officers together and said: \par "In war, there are various indirect methods of attack, and \par numbers do not count for everything. [The commentator here \par quotes Sun Tzu, V. SS. 5, 6 and 10.] Now the rebels have pitched \par their camp in the midst of thick grass which will easily burn \par when the wind blows. If we set fire to it at night, they will be \par thrown into a panic, and we can make a sortie and attack them on \par all sides at once, thus emulating the achievement of T`ien Tan.' \par [See p. 90.] That same evening, a strong breeze sprang up; so \par Huang-fu Sung instructed his soldiers to bind reeds together into \par torches and mount guard on the city walls, after which he sent \par out a band of daring men, who stealthily made their way through \par the lines and started the fire with loud shouts and yells. \par Simultaneously, a glare of light shot up from the city walls, and \par Huang-fu Sung, sounding his drums, led a rapid charge, which \par threw the rebels into confusion and put them to headlong flight." \par [HOU HAN SHU, ch. 71.] ]\par \par 10. (5) When you start a fire, be to windward of it. Do \par not attack from the leeward.\par \par [Chang Yu, following Tu Yu, says: "When you make a fire, \par the enemy will retreat away from it; if you oppose his retreat \par and attack him then, he will fight desperately, which will not \par conduce to your success." A rather more obvious explanation is \par given by Tu Mu: "If the wind is in the east, begin burning to \par the east of the enemy, and follow up the attack yourself from \par that side. If you start the fire on the east side, and then \par attack from the west, you will suffer in the same way as your \par enemy."]\par \par 11. A wind that rises in the daytime lasts long, but a \par night breeze soon falls.\par \par [Cf. Lao Tzu's saying: "A violent wind does not last the \par space of a morning." (TAO TE CHING, chap. 23.) Mei Yao-ch`en \par and Wang Hsi say: "A day breeze dies down at nightfall, and a \par night breeze at daybreak. This is what happens as a general \par rule." The phenomenon observed may be correct enough, but how \par this sense is to be obtained is not apparent.]\par \par 12. In every army, the five developments connected with \par fire must be known, the movements of the stars calculated, and a \par watch kept for the proper days.\par \par [Tu Mu says: "We must make calculations as to the paths of \par the stars, and watch for the days on which wind will rise, \par before making our attack with fire." Chang Yu seems to interpret \par the text differently: "We must not only know how to assail our \par opponents with fire, but also be on our guard against similar \par attacks from them."]\par \par 13. Hence those who use fire as an aid to the attack show \par intelligence; those who use water as an aid to the attack gain an \par accession of strength.\par 14. By means of water, an enemy may be intercepted, but not \par robbed of all his belongings.\par \par [Ts`ao Kung's note is: "We can merely obstruct the enemy's \par road or divide his army, but not sweep away all his accumulated \par stores." Water can do useful service, but it lacks the terrible \par destructive power of fire. This is the reason, Chang Yu \par concludes, why the former is dismissed in a couple of sentences, \par whereas the attack by fire is discussed in detail. Wu Tzu (ch. \par 4) speaks thus of the two elements: "If an army is encamped on \par low-lying marshy ground, from which the water cannot run off, and \par where the rainfall is heavy, it may be submerged by a flood. If \par an army is encamped in wild marsh lands thickly overgrown with \par weeds and brambles, and visited by frequent gales, it may be \par exterminated by fire."]\par \par 15. Unhappy is the fate of one who tries to win his battles \par and succeed in his attacks without cultivating the spirit of \par enterprise; for the result is waste of time and general \par stagnation.\par \par [This is one of the most perplexing passages in Sun Tzu. \par Ts`ao Kung says: "Rewards for good service should not be \par deferred a single day." And Tu Mu: "If you do not take \par opportunity to advance and reward the deserving, your \par subordinates will not carry out your commands, and disaster will \par ensue." For several reasons, however, and in spite of the \par formidable array of scholars on the other side, I prefer the \par interpretation suggested by Mei Yao-ch`en alone, whose words I \par will quote: "Those who want to make sure of succeeding in their \par battles and assaults must seize the favorable moments when they \par come and not shrink on occasion from heroic measures: that is to \par say, they must resort to such means of attack of fire, water and \par the like. What they must not do, and what will prove fatal, is \par to sit still and simply hold to the advantages they have got."]\par \par 16. Hence the saying: The enlightened ruler lays his plans \par well ahead; the good general cultivates his resources.\par \par [Tu Mu quotes the following from the SAN LUEH, ch. 2: "The \par warlike prince controls his soldiers by his authority, kits them \par together by good faith, and by rewards makes them serviceable. \par If faith decays, there will be disruption; if rewards are \par deficient, commands will not be respected."]\par \par 17. Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your \par troops unless there is something to be gained; fight not unless \par the position is critical.\par \par [Sun Tzu may at times appear to be over-cautious, but he \par never goes so far in that direction as the remarkable passage in \par the TAO TE CHING, ch. 69. "I dare not take the initiative, but \par prefer to act on the defensive; I dare not advance an inch, but \par prefer to retreat a foot."]\par \par 18. No ruler should put troops into the field merely to \par gratify his own spleen; no general should fight a battle simply \par out of pique.\par 19. If it is to your advantage, make a forward move; if \par not, stay where you are.\par \par [This is repeated from XI. ss. 17. Here I feel convinced \par that it is an interpolation, for it is evident that ss. 20 ought \par to follow immediately on ss. 18.]\par \par 20. Anger may in time change to gladness; vexation may be \par succeeded by content.\par 21. But a kingdom that has once been destroyed can never \par come again into being;\par \par [The Wu State was destined to be a melancholy example of \par this saying.]\par \par nor can the dead ever be brought back to life.\par 22. Hence the enlightened ruler is heedful, and the good \par general full of caution. This is the way to keep a country at \par peace and an army intact.\par \par \par [1] "Unless you enter the tiger's lair, you cannot get hold of \par the tiger's cubs."\par \par -----------------------------------------------------------------\par \par XIII. THE USE OF SPIES\par \par \par 1. Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men \par and marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the \par people and a drain on the resources of the State. The daily \par expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver.\par \par [Cf. II. ss. ss. 1, 13, 14.]\par \par There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop \par down exhausted on the highways.\par \par [Cf. TAO TE CHING, ch. 30: "Where troops have been \par quartered, brambles and thorns spring up. Chang Yu has the note: \par "We may be reminded of the saying: 'On serious ground, gather in \par plunder.' Why then should carriage and transportation cause \par exhaustion on the highways?--The answer is, that not victuals \par alone, but all sorts of munitions of war have to be conveyed to \par the army. Besides, the injunction to 'forage on the enemy' only \par means that when an army is deeply engaged in hostile territory, \par scarcity of food must be provided against. Hence, without being \par solely dependent on the enemy for corn, we must forage in order \par that there may be an uninterrupted flow of supplies. Then, \par again, there are places like salt deserts where provisions being \par unobtainable, supplies from home cannot be dispensed with."]\par \par As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in \par their labor.\par \par [Mei Yao-ch`en says: "Men will be lacking at the plough-\par tail." The allusion is to the system of dividing land into nine \par parts, each consisting of about 15 acres, the plot in the center \par being cultivated on behalf of the State by the tenants of the \par other eight. It was here also, so Tu Mu tells us, that their \par cottages were built and a well sunk, to be used by all in common. \par [See II. ss. 12, note.] In time of war, one of the families had \par to serve in the army, while the other seven contributed to its \par support. Thus, by a levy of 100,000 men (reckoning one able-\par bodied soldier to each family) the husbandry of 700,000 families \par would be affected.]\par \par 2. Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving \par for the victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, \par to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because \par one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honors \par and emoluments,\par \par ["For spies" is of course the meaning, though it would spoil \par the effect of this curiously elaborate exordium if spies were \par actually mentioned at this point.]\par \par is the height of inhumanity.\par \par [Sun Tzu's agreement is certainly ingenious. He begins by \par adverting to the frightful misery and vast expenditure of blood \par and treasure which war always brings in its train. Now, unless \par you are kept informed of the enemy's condition, and are ready to \par strike at the right moment, a war may drag on for years. The \par only way to get this information is to employ spies, and it is \par impossible to obtain trustworthy spies unless they are properly \par paid for their services. But it is surely false economy to \par grudge a comparatively trifling amount for this purpose, when \par every day that the war lasts eats up an incalculably greater sum. \par This grievous burden falls on the shoulders of the poor, and \par hence Sun Tzu concludes that to neglect the use of spies is \par nothing less than a crime against humanity.]\par \par 3. One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help \par to his sovereign, no master of victory.\par \par [This idea, that the true object of war is peace, has its \par root in the national temperament of the Chinese. Even so far \par back as 597 B.C., these memorable words were uttered by Prince \par Chuang of the Ch`u State: "The [Chinese] character for 'prowess' \par is made up of [the characters for] 'to stay' and 'a spear' \par (cessation of hostilities). Military prowess is seen in the \par repression of cruelty, the calling in of weapons, the \par preservation of the appointment of Heaven, the firm establishment \par of merit, the bestowal of happiness on the people, putting \par harmony between the princes, the diffusion of wealth."]\par \par 4. Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good \par general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the \par reach of ordinary men, is FOREKNOWLEDGE.\par \par [That is, knowledge of the enemy's dispositions, and what he \par means to do.]\par \par 5. Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; \par it cannot be obtained inductively from experience,\par \par [Tu Mu's note is: "[knowledge of the enemy] cannot be \par gained by reasoning from other analogous cases."]\par \par nor by any deductive calculation.\par \par [Li Ch`uan says: "Quantities like length, breadth, \par distance and magnitude, are susceptible of exact mathematical \par determination; human actions cannot be so calculated."]\par \par 6. Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be \par obtained from other men.\par \par [Mei Yao-ch`en has rather an interesting note: "Knowledge \par of the spirit-world is to be obtained by divination; information \par in natural science may be sought by inductive reasoning; the laws \par of the universe can be verified by mathematical calculation: but \par the dispositions of an enemy are ascertainable through spies and \par spies alone."]\par \par 7. Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: \par (1) Local spies; (2) inward spies; (3) converted spies; (4) \par doomed spies; (5) surviving spies.\par 8. When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can \par discover the secret system. This is called "divine manipulation \par of the threads." It is the sovereign's most precious faculty.\par \par [Cromwell, one of the greatest and most practical of all \par cavalry leaders, had officers styled 'scout masters,' whose \par business it was to collect all possible information regarding the \par enemy, through scouts and spies, etc., and much of his success in \par war was traceable to the previous knowledge of the enemy's moves \par thus gained." [1] ]\par \par 9. Having LOCAL SPIES means employing the services of the \par inhabitants of a district.\par \par [Tu Mu says: "In the enemy's country, win people over by \par kind treatment, and use them as spies."]\par \par 10. Having INWARD SPIES, making use of officials of the \par enemy.\par \par [Tu Mu enumerates the following classes as likely to do good \par service in this respect: "Worthy men who have been degraded from \par office, criminals who have undergone punishment; also, favorite \par concubines who are greedy for gold, men who are aggrieved at \par being in subordinate positions, or who have been passed over in \par the distribution of posts, others who are anxious that their side \par should be defeated in order that they may have a chance of \par displaying their ability and talents, fickle turncoats who always \par want to have a foot in each boat. Officials of these several \par kinds," he continues, "should be secretly approached and bound to \par one's interests by means of rich presents. In this way you will \par be able to find out the state of affairs in the enemy's country, \par ascertain the plans that are being formed against you, and \par moreover disturb the harmony and create a breach between the \par sovereign and his ministers." The necessity for extreme caution, \par however, in dealing with "inward spies," appears from an \par historical incident related by Ho Shih: "Lo Shang, Governor of \par I-Chou, sent his general Wei Po to attack the rebel Li Hsiung of \par Shu in his stronghold at P`i. After each side had experienced a \par number of victories and defeats, Li Hsiung had recourse to the \par services of a certain P`o-t`ai, a native of Wu-tu. He began to \par have him whipped until the blood came, and then sent him off to \par Lo Shang, whom he was to delude by offering to cooperate with him \par from inside the city, and to give a fire signal at the right \par moment for making a general assault. Lo Shang, confiding in \par these promises, march out all his best troops, and placed Wei Po \par and others at their head with orders to attack at P`o-t`ai's \par bidding. Meanwhile, Li Hsiung's general, Li Hsiang, had prepared \par an ambuscade on their line of march; and P`o-t`ai, having reared \par long scaling-ladders against the city walls, now lighted the \par beacon-fire. Wei Po's men raced up on seeing the signal and \par began climbing the ladders as fast as they could, while others \par were drawn up by ropes lowered from above. More than a hundred \par of Lo Shang's soldiers entered the city in this way, every one of \par whom was forthwith beheaded. Li Hsiung then charged with all his \par forces, both inside and outside the city, and routed the enemy \par completely." [This happened in 303 A.D. I do not know where Ho \par Shih got the story from. It is not given in the biography of Li \par Hsiung or that of his father Li T`e, CHIN SHU, ch. 120, 121.]\par \par 11. Having CONVERTED SPIES, getting hold of the enemy's \par spies and using them for our own purposes.\par \par [By means of heavy bribes and liberal promises detaching \par them from the enemy's service, and inducing them to carry back \par false information as well as to spy in turn on their own \par countrymen. On the other hand, Hsiao Shih-hsien says that we \par pretend not to have detected him, but contrive to let him carry \par away a false impression of what is going on. Several of the \par commentators accept this as an alternative definition; but that \par it is not what Sun Tzu meant is conclusively proved by his \par subsequent remarks about treating the converted spy generously \par (ss. 21 sqq.). Ho Shih notes three occasions on which converted \par spies were used with conspicuous success: (1) by T`ien Tan in \par his defense of Chi-mo (see supra, p. 90); (2) by Chao She on his \par march to O-yu (see p. 57); and by the wily Fan Chu in 260 B.C., \par when Lien P`o was conducting a defensive campaign against Ch`in. \par The King of Chao strongly disapproved of Lien P`o's cautious and \par dilatory methods, which had been unable to avert a series of \par minor disasters, and therefore lent a ready ear to the reports of \par his spies, who had secretly gone over to the enemy and were \par already in Fan Chu's pay. They said: "The only thing which \par causes Ch`in anxiety is lest Chao Kua should be made general. \par Lien P`o they consider an easy opponent, who is sure to be \par vanquished in the long run." Now this Chao Kua was a sun of the \par famous Chao She. From his boyhood, he had been wholly engrossed \par in the study of war and military matters, until at last he came \par to believe that there was no commander in the whole Empire who \par could stand against him. His father was much disquieted by this \par overweening conceit, and the flippancy with which he spoke of \par such a serious thing as war, and solemnly declared that if ever \par Kua was appointed general, he would bring ruin on the armies of \par Chao. This was the man who, in spite of earnest protests from \par his own mother and the veteran statesman Lin Hsiang-ju, was now \par sent to succeed Lien P`o. Needless to say, he proved no match \par for the redoubtable Po Ch`i and the great military power of \par Ch`in. He fell into a trap by which his army was divided into \par two and his communications cut; and after a desperate resistance \par lasting 46 days, during which the famished soldiers devoured one \par another, he was himself killed by an arrow, and his whole force, \par amounting, it is said, to 400,000 men, ruthlessly put to the \par sword.]\par \par 12. Having DOOMED SPIES, doing certain things openly for \par purposes of deception, and allowing our spies to know of them and \par report them to the enemy.\par \par [Tu Yu gives the best exposition of the meaning: "We \par ostentatiously do thing calculated to deceive our own spies, who \par must be led to believe that they have been unwittingly disclosed. \par Then, when these spies are captured in the enemy's lines, they \par will make an entirely false report, and the enemy will take \par measures accordingly, only to find that we do something quite \par different. The spies will thereupon be put to death." As an \par example of doomed spies, Ho Shih mentions the prisoners released \par by Pan Ch`ao in his campaign against Yarkand. (See p. 132.) He \par also refers to T`ang Chien, who in 630 A.D. was sent by T`ai \par Tsung to lull the Turkish Kahn Chieh-li into fancied security, \par until Li Ching was able to deliver a crushing blow against him. \par Chang Yu says that the Turks revenged themselves by killing T`ang \par Chien, but this is a mistake, for we read in both the old and the \par New T`ang History (ch. 58, fol. 2 and ch. 89, fol. 8 \par respectively) that he escaped and lived on until 656. Li I-chi \par played a somewhat similar part in 203 B.C., when sent by the King \par of Han to open peaceful negotiations with Ch`i. He has certainly \par more claim to be described a "doomed spy", for the king of Ch`i, \par being subsequently attacked without warning by Han Hsin, and \par infuriated by what he considered the treachery of Li I-chi, \par ordered the unfortunate envoy to be boiled alive.]\par \par 13. SURVIVING SPIES, finally, are those who bring back news \par from the enemy's camp.\par \par [This is the ordinary class of spies, properly so called, \par forming a regular part of the army. Tu Mu says: "Your surviving \par spy must be a man of keen intellect, though in outward appearance \par a fool; of shabby exterior, but with a will of iron. He must be \par active, robust, endowed with physical strength and courage; \par thoroughly accustomed to all sorts of dirty work, able to endure \par hunger and cold, and to put up with shame and ignominy." Ho Shih \par tells the following story of Ta`hsi Wu of the Sui dynasty: "When \par he was governor of Eastern Ch`in, Shen-wu of Ch`i made a hostile \par movement upon Sha-yuan. The Emperor T`ai Tsu [? Kao Tsu] sent \par Ta-hsi Wu to spy upon the enemy. He was accompanied by two other \par men. All three were on horseback and wore the enemy's uniform. \par When it was dark, they dismounted a few hundred feet away from \par the enemy's camp and stealthily crept up to listen, until they \par succeeded in catching the passwords used in the army. Then they \par got on their horses again and boldly passed through the camp \par under the guise of night-watchmen; and more than once, happening \par to come across a soldier who was committing some breach of \par discipline, they actually stopped to give the culprit a sound \par cudgeling! Thus they managed to return with the fullest possible \par information about the enemy's dispositions, and received warm \par commendation from the Emperor, who in consequence of their report \par was able to inflict a severe defeat on his adversary."]\par \par 14. Hence it is that which none in the whole army are more \par intimate relations to be maintained than with spies.\par \par [Tu Mu and Mei Yao-ch`en point out that the spy is \par privileged to enter even the general's private sleeping-tent.]\par \par None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business \par should greater secrecy be preserved.\par \par [Tu Mu gives a graphic touch: all communication with spies \par should be carried "mouth-to-ear." The following remarks on spies \par may be quoted from Turenne, who made perhaps larger use of them \par than any previous commander: "Spies are attached to those who \par give them most, he who pays them ill is never served. They \par should never be known to anybody; nor should they know one \par another. When they propose anything very material, secure their \par persons, or have in your possession their wives and children as \par hostages for their fidelity. Never communicate anything to them \par but what is absolutely necessary that they should know. [2] ]\par \par 15. Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain \par intuitive sagacity.\par \par [Mei Yao-ch`en says: "In order to use them, one must know \par fact from falsehood, and be able to discriminate between honesty \par and double-dealing." Wang Hsi in a different interpretation \par thinks more along the lines of "intuitive perception" and \par "practical intelligence." Tu Mu strangely refers these \par attributes to the spies themselves: "Before using spies we must \par assure ourselves as to their integrity of character and the \par extent of their experience and skill." But he continues: "A \par brazen face and a crafty disposition are more dangerous than \par mountains or rivers; it takes a man of genius to penetrate such." \par So that we are left in some doubt as to his real opinion on the \par passage."]\par \par 16. They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and \par straightforwardness.\par \par [Chang Yu says: "When you have attracted them by \par substantial offers, you must treat them with absolute sincerity; \par then they will work for you with all their might."]\par \par 17. Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make \par certain of the truth of their reports.\par \par [Mei Yao-ch`en says: "Be on your guard against the \par possibility of spies going over to the service of the enemy."]\par \par 18. Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind \par of business.\par \par [Cf. VI. ss. 9.]\par \par 19. If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before \par the time is ripe, he must be put to death together with the man \par to whom the secret was told.\par \par [Word for word, the translation here is: "If spy matters \par are heard before [our plans] are carried out," etc. Sun Tzu's \par main point in this passage is: Whereas you kill the spy himself \par "as a punishment for letting out the secret," the object of \par killing the other man is only, as Ch`en Hao puts it, "to stop his \par mouth" and prevent news leaking any further. If it had already \par been repeated to others, this object would not be gained. Either \par way, Sun Tzu lays himself open to the charge of inhumanity, \par though Tu Mu tries to defend him by saying that the man deserves \par to be put to death, for the spy would certainly not have told the \par secret unless the other had been at pains to worm it out of \par him."]\par \par 20. Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a \par city, or to assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to \par begin by finding out the names of the attendants, the aides-de-\par camp,\par \par [Literally "visitors", is equivalent, as Tu Yu says, to \par "those whose duty it is to keep the general supplied with \par information," which naturally necessitates frequent interviews \par with him.]\par \par and door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. Our \par spies must be commissioned to ascertain these.\par \par [As the first step, no doubt towards finding out if any of \par these important functionaries can be won over by bribery.]\par \par 21. The enemy's spies who have come to spy on us must be \par sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. \par Thus they will become converted spies and available for our \par service.\par 22. It is through the information brought by the converted \par spy that we are able to acquire and employ local and inward \par spies.\par \par [Tu Yu says: "through conversion of the enemy's spies we \par learn the enemy's condition." And Chang Yu says: "We must tempt \par the converted spy into our service, because it is he that knows \par which of the local inhabitants are greedy of gain, and which of \par the officials are open to corruption."]\par \par 23. It is owing to his information, again, that we can \par cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy.\par \par [Chang Yu says, "because the converted spy knows how the \par enemy can best be deceived."]\par \par 24. Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy \par can be used on appointed occasions.\par 25. The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is \par knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, \par in the first instance, from the converted spy.\par \par [As explained in ss. 22-24. He not only brings information \par himself, but makes it possible to use the other kinds of spy to \par advantage.]\par \par Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the \par utmost liberality.\par 26. Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty\par \par [Sun Tzu means the Shang dynasty, founded in 1766 B.C. Its \par name was changed to Yin by P`an Keng in 1401.\par \par was due to I Chih\par \par [Better known as I Yin, the famous general and statesman \par who took part in Ch`eng T`ang's campaign against Chieh Kuei.]\par \par who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of the Chou \par dynasty was due to Lu Ya\par \par [Lu Shang rose to high office under the tyrant Chou Hsin, \par whom he afterwards helped to overthrow. Popularly known as T`ai \par Kung, a title bestowed on him by Wen Wang, he is said to have \par composed a treatise on war, erroneously identified with the \par LIU T`AO.]\par \par who had served under the Yin.\par \par [There is less precision in the Chinese than I have thought \par it well to introduce into my translation, and the commentaries on \par the passage are by no means explicit. But, having regard to the \par context, we can hardly doubt that Sun Tzu is holding up I Chih \par and Lu Ya as illustrious examples of the converted spy, or \par something closely analogous. His suggestion is, that the Hsia \par and Yin dynasties were upset owing to the intimate knowledge of \par their weaknesses and shortcoming which these former ministers \par were able to impart to the other side. Mei Yao-ch`en appears to \par resent any such aspersion on these historic names: "I Yin and Lu \par Ya," he says, "were not rebels against the Government. Hsia \par could not employ the former, hence Yin employed him. Yin could \par not employ the latter, hence Hou employed him. Their great \par achievements were all for the good of the people." Ho Shih is \par also indignant: "How should two divinely inspired men such as I \par and Lu have acted as common spies? Sun Tzu's mention of them \par simply means that the proper use of the five classes of spies is \par a matter which requires men of the highest mental caliber like I \par and Lu, whose wisdom and capacity qualified them for the task. \par The above words only emphasize this point." Ho Shih believes \par then that the two heroes are mentioned on account of their \par supposed skill in the use of spies. But this is very weak.]\par \par 27. Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise \par general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for \par purposes of spying and thereby they achieve great results.\par \par [Tu Mu closes with a note of warning: "Just as water, which \par carries a boat from bank to bank, may also be the means of \par sinking it, so reliance on spies, while production of great \par results, is oft-times the cause of utter destruction."]\par \par Spies are a most important element in water, because on them \par depends an army's ability to move.\par \par [Chia Lin says that an army without spies is like a man with \par ears or eyes.]\par } TAGNot A Winamp FileWrapster File